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Introduction
The ﬁnancial crisis 2007-2009, notwithstanding its detrimental eﬀects for devel-
oped and emerging economies around the world, has been a blessing for academics
working in the ﬁelds of Macro-Finance, the node and interaction between ﬁnancial
markets and the real economy. The relevance of ﬁnancial markets for the macroe-
conomy has become apparent in full force, sparking a new wave of research in this
area; away from models in which the state and soundness of capital and credit
markets does not play any substantial role. While valuable and widely regarded
attempts to build theoretical models, which are able to replicate some of the key
causalities of the crisis1, have been made, a major quantum leap for macroeconomic
modeling is missing to this date.
As a quasi natural experiment, the crisis provides an opportunity to identify
the most relevant links between ﬁnancial markets and the macroeconomy by co-
herent display of the available data and formal identiﬁcation of the key empirical
relationships. This will provide guidance in determining the necessary ingredients
to new macro-models, which, in turn, can allow deeper insights into the complex
interactions at work.
The thesis presented here is aimed at contributing to the identiﬁcation of cen-
tral empirical relationships by analyzing the role of the banking sector and ﬁnancial
markets during the crisis.
While the complex developments in the ﬁnancial sector have laid the ground
for the cascade of dismal events after the collapse of Lehman Brothers on the 15th
of September 2008, the main focus and fear of both central banks and governments
has been the contraction in the supply of credit to the real economy. In this respect,
the research on the Great Depression (ﬁrst and foremost Bernanke (1983)), and
its implications for the substantial eﬀect of credit supply on real economy activity,
has been inﬂuential in framing the mindset and actions of policy makers in the
US, Europe, and many other countries.
Even though the increasing sophistication of credit markets in the last decades,
materialized through the explosion in securitization activities, did cause a shift of
1See Brunnermeier (2009) and Mizen (2008) for a comprehensive illustration of the key factors
and developments of the ﬁnancial crisis 2007-2009.
iii
Introduction
business ﬁnance to debt instruments such as corporate bonds and commercial
paper, the traditional bank loan still remains vital for many ﬁrms and individuals,
that do not necessarily have access to funding from the capital markets. In fact,
in most developed countries, small and medium sized businesses are creating a
signiﬁcant, if not the predominant, share of the jobs in the economy; and it is
exactly them, which are highly dependent on bank loans as a source of funding for
their investments and operations. At the same time, the increased complexity and
globalization of ﬁnancial markets had an inﬂuence on the structure and dynamics
of the economies in the developed world.
Both politicians and the press have painted a picture of a serious shortage in
the supply of credit to businesses and individuals in 2008/2009, despite the exten-
sive and extraordinary measures taken by central banks and the unprecedented
government rescue packages put in place to shore up banks’ balance sheets.
Chapter 1 will get to the bottom of the most prominent claims held by the
proponents of the “credit-crunch” theory. While it does not attempt to answer the
question of whether there was a shortage in credit-supply or not, its purpose is to
examine the validity of the most prominent arguments made for a “credit-crunch”,
which are mainly based on bank balance sheet weaknesses. In particular, a re-
duction in loans to small businesses, insuﬃcient equity buﬀers, an over-reliance on
capital market funding, liquidity shortages, and excessive risk taking are among
the most frequently stated characteristics and causes of the alleged squeeze in
banks’ supply of funding. To sensibly address these points, bank-individual data
from the quarterly Reports of Condition and Income (CALL reports) is employed,
which provides extensive information on the balance sheet positions of all Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) member banks and savings institutions. In-
terestingly, convincing evidence can only be found for dangerously illiquid balance
sheets and strongly increased risk taking, whereas a precipitation in small business
lending, generally under-capitalized banks, and a heavy reliance on capital market
funding, cannot be conﬁrmed with the comprehensive dataset.
While Chapter 1 provides an important general insight, namely that liquidity
shortages and heightened risk-taking are relevant catalysts, or even triggers, of the
ﬁnancial crisis 2007-2009, it does not examine which factors are actually driving
the supply of credit.
Determining which factors are relevant for bank lending in the aggregate, how-
ever, requires a more formal approach, which is taken in Chapter 2. Individual
banks’ lending decisions are made on the basis of their balance sheet characteris-
tics, given current and expected economic conditions. For example, the larger the
equity buﬀer of a given bank, the greater is, ceteris paribus, its capacity to supply
additional loans. An otherwise identical bank with a lower equity ratio is not as
well insulated against possible credit defaults, and may also have higher costs of
iv
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reﬁnancing, given its higher probability of default. This, in turn, increases its
marginal costs and makes it less willing to take on additional loans than the bank
with the thicker equity cushion. Credit supply, however, is not directly observ-
able; only lending is, which merely represents a, possibly constrained, equilibrium
of supply and demand. Hence, any empirical analysis of credit supply determi-
nants faces a fundamental identiﬁcation problem, as over time, lending will also
be inﬂuenced by credit demand. The literature has made progress on this issue
by utilizing individual banks’ balance sheet data. The idea is that at one point in
time, banks with stronger balance sheets have a higher credit supply capacity, and
therefore the cross-sectional variation in observed lending growth can identify how
sensitive lending decisions are with respect to various balance sheet characteris-
tics. Implicitly, it is assumed that bank-individual characteristics pin down credit
supply decisions, whereas the factors driving demand are common to at least a
group of banks (Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004)). This literature, however, is
primarily concerned with the eﬀect of monetary policy on bank lending, called
the bank lending channel. The eﬀect of monetary policy on bank lending is then
typically measured for an “average” bank.
Based on the econometric model introduced by Kashyap and Stein (2000) and
the CALL report data mentioned above, the analysis in Chapter 2 goes further by
introducing a consistent aggregation procedure over the cross-section, in order to
derive a classiﬁcation of the importance of a wide variety of balance sheet charac-
teristics for the time-variation in aggregate lending - the taxonomy of bank balance
sheet characteristics. The results indicate that aggregate lending of small banks is
mainly driven by the sensitivity of lending with respect to three characteristics: 1.
Core equity, which proved crucial for strong lending growth before and during the
crisis; 2. The riskiness of its business model measured by the Basel I risk weight,
suggesting a momentum in risk taking before Q3 2008; and 3. A common ex-
cess demand component. For the largest 5% of banks, the emerging picture looks
quite diﬀerent. The availability of capital market funding, proxied by the exter-
nal ﬁnancing ratio, was driving the largest part of large banks’ lending decisions
in the aggregate. As a next step, it is then analyzed in how far macroeconomic
conditions can explain the changes in lending sensitivities over time. It appears
that about half of the variation of small banks’ lending sensitivities with respect
to their core equity ratios and Basel I risk weights can be rationalized by improv-
ing and deteriorating expectations regarding future economic conditions, whereas
macro-factors do not seem to explain a large part of large banks’ aggregate lending
dynamics. Two major implications for banking regulation can be drawn: Firstly,
the new Basel III regulations seem capable to smooth lending dynamics over the
business cycle and limit the momentum in risk-taking of small banks. Secondly,
a close monitoring of large banks’ non-equity and non-deposit ﬁnancing activities
v
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would be advisable in order to assess potentially destabilizing eﬀects of an excessive
reliance on liquidity provision from ﬁnancial markets.
As the approach in Chapter 2 is eﬀectively based on individual banks’ lending
decisions, which are then aggregated up, the macroeconomic environment is taken
as exogenous. The results are robust to the most probable feedback eﬀect channels,
yet, precisely the feedback eﬀects from the ﬁnancial sector to the real economy are
of great interest on their own.
In Chapter 3, the real eﬀects of ﬁnancial market conditions and credit sup-
ply take center stage. During crisis times, the transmission mechanisms between
ﬁnancial markets and the real economy can be diﬀerent than in normal times
(Azariadis and Smith (1998)). Normal linear econometric models, however, do not
capture conditional transmission mechanisms. To allow for potentially diﬀerent
dynamics under tranquil, as opposed to distressed, ﬁnancial markets, I propose
an endogenous Threshold-VAR (TVAR) model. It distinguishes between two dif-
ferent regimes, in which the parameters governing the dynamics of the system
can be totally diﬀerent. The two regimes are identiﬁed by a threshold, which it-
self is an endogenous variable. In this way, the TVAR model is general enough,
not only to capture diﬀerent transmission mechanisms conditional on endogenous
variables like ﬁnancial market conditions, but also to generate diﬀerent impulse
responses depending on the size and direction of structural shocks. The magni-
tude of the spread between interbank lending rates and US Treasury yields (TED
spread) proxies the degree of distress in ﬁnancial markets, and serves as the en-
dogenous threshold in the model. The “normal” (low TED spread) regime and
the “bad” (high TED spread) regime indeed exhibit distinctively diﬀerent prop-
agation mechanisms. Generally, the transmission mechanism of ﬁnancial market
conditions to the real economy is much more pronounced in the high TED spread
regime. Non-linear Impulse Response and Variance Decomposition analysis fur-
ther suggests, that a signiﬁcant share of the real impact during the dot-com bubble
in 1999-2000 and of the current ﬁnancial crisis is due to adverse shocks to ﬁnancial
market conditions. Despite some evidence for a mutual feedback eﬀect between ﬁ-
nancial market conditions and liquidity in regime 2, as suggested by Brunnermeier
and Pedersen (2009), the feedback from liquidity shocks to ﬁnancial market condi-
tions and the real eﬀects of liquidity shocks are small and short-lived. Even though
the real eﬀects of ﬁnancial market conditions are signiﬁcant, they are not account-
able for more than one third of the variation in GDP growth. Financial market
conditions hence can only explain a part of the observed variations in economic
growth. As shocks to GDP growth itself explain most of the variation, changes in
the expectation of future economic conditions are likely to be a relevant factor for
the real dynamics observed in the run-up and during the recent ﬁnancial crisis.
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Chapter 1
Facts and Myths about Banking
Sector Weaknesses in the US Before
and During the Financial Crisis of
2007-2009
Evidence from CALL Reports
1.1 Introduction
The 2008/2009 ﬁnancial crisis has been widely associated with an entailing “credit-
crunch”. Some authors, however, have argued that there is no clear evidence to
support this view. While this paper will not provide new evidence for, or against,
a shortage of credit-supply, its aim is to examine the most prominent arguments
made for a “credit-crunch”, which mainly hinge on bank balance sheet weaknesses.
By analyzing the comprehensive and publicly available data from the Reports of
Condition and Income (CALL reports), a much more detailed view on the valid-
ity of the central claims of the “credit-crunch” discussion is obtained, compared
to previous analyses, which have mostly been based on aggregate data1. After
reviewing some of the aggregate data from the Flow of Funds and pointing out
their main implications and shortcomings, the following assertions are addressed:
1. Small banks, which did not receive direct government support, had to cut
lending the most. As they are the most important providers of funding to
small businesses, small businesses suﬀered a “credit crunch”.
1See Chari et al. (2008)
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2. Capital ratios were far too low. As a result, banks had to reduce their risky
assets and had no capacity for granting loans to businesses.
3. Banks increasingly ﬁnanced themselves through capital markets. Therefore,
once investors stopped buying their debt securities, the ability of banks to
reﬁnance themselves was severely hindered and they simply did not have the
necessary liquidity to supply loans to the real economy.
4. The fact that banks experienced problems when capital markets dried up,
is due to the insuﬃcient levels of cash and other liquid assets, which would
have been needed to hedge the liquidity risks.
5. Banks exhibited excessive risk taking behavior, for the sake of maximizing
their returns. Once the risks were materializing, the losses on their asset
portfolios became so large, that banks were forced to cut down on lending
to reduce risks.
The focus of the paper is on assessing the plausibility of the above claims, by
inspecting the underlying statements regarding bank balance sheet weaknesses.
Concretely, the respective claims are based on 1. a precipitation of small business
loan supply, 2. low capital ratios, 3. an extraordinarily high degree of capital
market ﬁnancing, 4. insuﬃcient liquidity buﬀers, and 5. excessive risk taking,
respectively.
Whereas I will show that there is no convincing evidence to support the ﬁrst
three claims above, the last two claims appear to be plausible.
The next section presents the evidence for a “credit crunch” in aggregate data
and the following section reviews the cross-sectional implications of the claims
stated above, with the help of the individual bank balance sheet data from the
CALL reports. The last section concludes by summarizing the claims’ validity and
the resulting implications.
1.2 Aggregate Data and its Implications for a ”Credit
Crunch”
Whereas, in general, the amount of outstanding debt of the non-ﬁnancial sector
has exhibited positive growth (Figure 1.1), the absolute amount of outstanding
debt of non-ﬁnancial businesses (Corporate and Non-Corporate) and households
has declined sharply since Q4 2008, as the data from the Flow of Funds shows2.
2The Flow of Funds data is obtained from the website of the Federal Reserve:
www.federalreserve.gov.
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The government sector (federal and local) has provided for the overall increase in
liabilities of the non-ﬁnancial sector by borrowing on a large scale.
The reduction in lending to non-ﬁnancial businesses per se, however, cannot be
interpreted as evidence for a “credit-crunch”. Firms have substituted bank lending
for other forms of ﬁnance, which becomes evident from the constantly growing net
bond issuances (Figures 1.1 and 1.2). While in the two years leading up to the
crisis, the share of bank lending rebounded slightly, the degree of dependency on
bank loans seems generally low, as bank loans account for less than one tenth of
total liabilities. Still, this is not an indication of the irrelevance of bank loans for
the economy in general. How vital bank loans are as a source of funding diﬀers
with ﬁrm size. Whereas small ﬁrms do not have immediate access to capital mar-
kets, since they normally cannot issue bonds or securitize their loans, large ﬁrms
have clearly made use of other forms of ﬁnance, as the pronounced decline in the
share of commercial bank loans in total credit market instruments of nonﬁnancial
Corporations shows (Figure 1.2). The picture for Non-Corporate ﬁrms (Figure
1.3), on the other hand, looks quite diﬀerent. Assuming that Non-Corporate ﬁrms
are on average smaller than Corporations, smaller ﬁrms seem indeed more depen-
dent on bank loans. The sharp decline in the share of bank lending after Q4 2008,
which is accompanied by a negative change in liabilities, hints towards a more
restrictive credit-supply in this respect. Notably, the decline in the share of bank
loans cannot be due to increases in base capital3, as net investment of proprietors
is negative. Other loans (see the caption of Figure 1.1 for a deﬁnition) and trade
payables are more resilient. However, for Non-Corporates those are only 40% and
25% of the size of outstanding bank loans, respectively. The by far largest part of
non-corporate liabilities is constituted by mortgages, which are basically reducing
to a net zero ﬂow by 2009.
Hence, even though other forms of ﬁnance have not dried up as severely as
bank loans, they also did not compensate for the shortfall.
Still, the decline in bank loans is not a direct proof for a “credit crunch”. After
all, the demand for loans is likely to have plummeted because of the deteriorating
macroeconomic environment. Nevertheless, a reduction in credit demand cannot
explain why the share of bank loans in credit market instruments has declined.
Obviously, bank loans were, on the margin, more diﬃcult to obtain than other
forms of ﬁnancing.
3As has been argued by Chari et al. (2008)
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The upper graph shows the quarterly debt ﬂows of selected non-ﬁnancial sectors (left scale)
together with the share of outstanding commercial bank loans in total debt of the non-ﬁnancial
sector (right scale). The lower graph depicts the liability ﬂows of non-ﬁnancial businesses, broken
down into Corporate Bonds, Bank Loans, Other Loans, and Mortgages. Bank Loans are loans
to non-ﬁnancial sectors from US chartered banks and foreign bank oﬃces in the US only. Loans
from banks with foreign residency are included in Other Loans, as well as syndicated loans, loans
from Credit Unions, Finance Institutions, Asset Backed Securities Issuers, the Government, and
Government Sponsored Enterprises. Flow data is seasonally adjusted. Source: Flow of Funds
(Tables F.2 and L.101) , Federal Reserve website www.federalreserve.gov
Figure 1.1: Outstanding Debt and Bank Loans - Non-Financial Sector
4
Chapter 1 Facts and Myths about Banking Sector Weaknesses
????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ?????????
??
????
?
???
?
???
??
?????
???
??
???????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????
?????????????????????????
??????????????
???????????????????
????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ?????????
????
?
???
???
???
??
?????
???
??
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?
???
?
???
?
???
??
???
???
??
??
??
???
???
??
??
???
??
???
???
???????????????
??????????
???????????
?????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
The upper graph depicts the quarterly ﬂow of non-ﬁnancial corporate liabilities, whereas the lower
graph shows selected components of credit market instruments (left scale) as well as the share of
commercial bank loans in total outstanding liabilities (right scale). Bank Loans are loans to the
non-ﬁnancial corporate sector from US chartered banks and foreign bank oﬃces in the US only.
Loans from banks with foreign residency are included in Other Loans, as well as syndicated loans,
loans from Credit Unions, Finance Institutions, Asset Backed Securities Issuers, the Government,
and Government Sponsored Enterprises. Flow data is seasonally adjusted. Source: Flow of Funds
(Tables F.102 and L.102), Federal Reserve website www.federalreserve.gov
Figure 1.2: Total Borrowing and Bank Loans - Non-Financial Corporate Businesses
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The upper graph depicts the quarterly ﬂow of non-ﬁnancial non-corporate liabilities, whereas
the lower graph shows selected components of credit market instruments (left scale) as well as
the share of commercial bank loans in total outstanding liabilities (right scale). Bank Loans are
loans to non-ﬁnancial non-corporate sector from US chartered banks and foreign bank oﬃces in
the US only. Loans from banks with foreign residency are included in Other Loans, as well as
syndicated loans, loans from Credit Unions, Finance Institutions, Asset Backed Securities Issuers,
the Government, and Government Sponsored Enterprises. Flow data is seasonally adjusted.
Source: Flow of Funds (Tables F.103 and L.103), Federal Reserve website www.federalreserve.gov
Figure 1.3: Total Borrowing and Bank Loans - Non-Financial Non-Corporate Busi-
nesses
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Some caveats are in order. Non-corporate businesses are not exclusively small
businesses. In fact, the small and medium sized businesses, which were supposedly
hit hardest by the insuﬃcient supply of credit, are Corporations. Also, the data
for non-corporate businesses in the Flow of Funds is merely an approximation. It
is based on the annual Statistics of Income4 and the quinquennial Survey of Small
Business Finances conducted by the Federal Reserve. It is unclear, how good an
approximation this is, and as such, may contain large errors. In this respect, the
CALL report data can provide a much better estimate, as ﬁling banks provide
detailed information on small business loans.
Another important source of information for the advocates of a “credit-crunch”
is the Chief Loan Oﬃcer survey data. In Figure 1.4, the net percentage of domestic
respondents (ﬁrms) reporting tightening standards for commercial and industrial
(C&I) loans is plotted over time, for both small and medium/large ﬁrms. A per-
centage of zero indicates that, on average, standards are neither tightening nor
relaxing. Starting from Q3 2007, credit standards were tightening rapidly.
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Net percentage of respondents (ﬁrms) of the Chief Loan Oﬃcer Survey, which reported tightening
credit standards for C&I loans. The blue line represents respondents of small ﬁrms, whereas the
red line pertains to respondents of medium-market and large ﬁrms (annual sales of $50 million
or more). Source: Chief Loan Oﬃcer Survey, Federal Reserve website www.federalreserve.gov
Figure 1.4: Chief Loan Oﬃcer Survey - C&I loans
4The Statistics of Income Survey (SOI) is conducted by the IRS on an annual basis, utilizing
the data on tax ﬁlings.
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In Q4 2008, a net percentage of above 70% of all respondents reported tight-
ening standards. This number is also signiﬁcantly larger than what has been
observed after the “dot-com bubble” in 2000 and 2001. Nevertheless, the informa-
tion content with respect to restrictions in the supply of credit is limited. Firstly,
it does not imply how restrictive the supply of credit was in absolute terms. Given
that standards were most probably too soft in previous periods, tighter standards
rather indicate a return to more sustainable lending practices. Secondly, tighten-
ing standards do not necessarily imply a lack of funding for economically viable
ﬁrms. Thirdly, the number of respondents is quite small (usually less than 60 chief
loan oﬃcers do reply), such that the survey data might not be representative or
suﬀer from an endogenous selection bias, as institutions with apparent issues or
problems may be more likely to reply.
Interestingly, there is not much of a diﬀerence in the response between smaller
and large ﬁrms. If smaller ﬁrms were really hit harder by the credit crunch, then
it is not reﬂected in the Chief Loan Oﬃcers Survey.
1.3 The Bank Perspective
To shed more light on the observed aggregate patterns, this chapter will take
the perspective of the lenders. Alongside, the claims about the banking sector
weaknesses from above are addressed. The analysis is based on the dataset pub-
lished by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)5, which consists of
the quarterly US CALL report data. The sample under consideration runs from
Q4 1992 until Q2 20116. Given that it covers all the banks chartered in the US,
as well as savings banks and savings associations, the sum of bank loans from all
institutions in the sample is a sensible approximation to aggregate bank lending7.
Savings banks and associations are fairly important providers of real estate loans
and small C&I loans, as Figure 1.5 shows. Small loans are deﬁned as loans with
a face value of less than 250,000 US Dollar8. It is highly unlikely, that large ﬁrms
5The data is publicly available for download at http://www2.fdic.gov/sdi/
6To obtain more compact graphs, usually a shorter sample is used. Only if earlier periods
exhibit diﬀerent trends or are vital for the interpretation of the data, the full sample is employed.
7It is not exactly equal to the economy-wide aggregate, as the dataset neither covers branches
and agencies of foreign banks in the US nor direct loans from banks residing in foreign countries.
Branches and agencies of foreign banks, however, make up a large share of total commercial and
industrial lending in the US (up to 21.2% in the last decade). Less detailed data is publicly
available through the FFIEC 002 forms, but is in general insuﬃcient or not applicable for the
purposes of this paper. Hence, the analysis here restricts itself to US chartered banks and FDIC
insured branches and agencies of foreign banks. Where the lack of information on foreign bank
loans is crucial to the argumentation, I will provide approximations of the possible impact of
foreign bank oﬃces’ activities.
8This deﬁnition for small loans is common in the literature. See for example Ashcraft (2006).
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would opt to demand such small loans9. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume
that, on average, small loans are also ﬂowing to small ﬁrms. In this sense, savings
institutions appear as a non-negligible provider of funding for small ﬁrms.
Table 1.1 presents an overview of the institutions in the sample. For reasons
of simplicity, all institutions shall be referred to as banks. Further details of the
FDIC dataset are presented in the Appendix.
Percentile Interval <25% 50% 66% 80% 90% 95% 99% >99%
Share in Agg Lending 0.847 2.2 2.6 3.8 5.2 5.4 17.4 62.5
Number of Savings Institutions 248 300 249 272 259 152 117 22.1
Number of Commercial Banks 2282 2230 1369 1144 751 353 286 79.7
- under Federal Charter 432 551 379 361 247 129 122 46.7
- under State Charter 1850 1679 989 782 504 225 163 33.0
Observations (per Quarter) 2532 2532 1620 1418 1013 506 405 102
Observations (Total - in Thousand) 179.7 179.7 115 100.6 71.9 36 28.8 7.2
The Percentile Intervals refer to the diﬀerent size groups. The group of the smallest banks,
denoted by a percentile interval of <25% , includes the 25% smallest institutions according to
the value of total assets. All groups are exclusive. Thus, the second percentile interval, 50% ,
contains the 50% smallest institutions, exclusive of the 25% smallest institutions of the previous
size group. The group of the largest banks, >99% , is comprised of the 1% largest institutions.
The presented statistics are based on the cross-section- and time-averages over the full sample,
from Q4 1992 until Q2 2011. The respective numbers of institutions are quarterly averages.
Observations (Total) denotes the total number of observations in the respective size group over
all quarters.
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
1.3.1 Bank Size and Small Business Loans
Small banks do dominantly provide small loans, as Figure 1.6 conﬁrms. This is
particularly true for C&I loans. As small banks most likely have smaller ﬁrms as
costumers, this ﬁgure conﬁrms that small loans are mainly ﬂowing to small ﬁrms.
However, it is not true that small banks are the main providers of small business
loans. The largest 1% of banks and savings institutions are actually providing the
bulk of small C&I loans (Table 1.2).
The central observation, however, is that the evidence for a “credit crunch” in
small business loans is mixed at best. Apart from a relatively small 5% decline
from 2008 to 2009, which compares to a decline in nominal GDP of around 2.6%
in the same period, there is no sign for an extreme reduction like in the aggregate
9Note that C&I loans include neither commercial real estate loans nor trade credit.
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The shares are calculated as the sum of outstanding loans by savings institutions (savings banks
and savings associations) relative to the sum of outstanding loans of all deposit taking institu-
tions. Small C&I loans, are commercial and industrial loans (no commercial real-estate loans
or trade credit) with a face value of less than 250,000 US$. Real Estate Loans comprise both,
commercial and private real estate. Tables 1.4 and 1.5 in the Appendix provide more detailed
deﬁnitions.
Figure 1.5: Share of Savings Institutions in Aggregate Lending
series. The largest banks even exhibit an increase in the outstanding small business
loans from Q2 2009 to Q2 2010. Overall, the reduction in small C&I loans is far
less severe than the reduction in total C&I loans, at least until Q2 2010 (Figure
1.7).
As explained in footnote 7, non-insured branches and agencies are not covered
in the sample, which may greatly distort the ﬁndings. These institutions are
generally regulated by the Federal Reserve Banks and do not have to ﬁle quarterly
CALL reports. But, they are required to ﬁle a so called FFIEC 002 form, which
contains a subset of the CALL report items. Unfortunately, the information on
Small Business Loans is only required for insured institutions, which are members
of the FDIC dataset already.
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The upper graph shows the average ratio of small loans to total loans for the respective size
groups. The share for an individual bank is calculated as the sum of outstanding small loans
(face value of 250,000 US$ or less, for all loan types for which the data is available), divided
by the sum of the total values of the corresponding loan types. The depicted average share is
the average among all institutions within the respective size group for a given quarter. The
loan types for which the amounts of small loans are available are: loans secured by nonfarm
nonresidential properties, C&I loans to US addresses, loans secured by farmland, and loans to
ﬁnance agricultural production. Small loans are reported in annual frequency in Q2 of every
year and from Q1 2010 onwards in quarterly frequency. The lower ﬁgure presents the ratio of
outstanding small C&I loans divided by total amount of outstanding C&I loans. For deﬁnitions
see Tables 1.4 and 1.5 in the Appendix.
Figure 1.6: Share of Small Loans in Total Loans for Diﬀerent Bank Sizes
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Small C&I loans (billion US$)
Percentile Interval 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
25 4.0 4.2 4.2 4.0 3.7
50 9.8 9.6 8.7 8.1 7.3
66 9.4 9.2 8.4 7.7 7.0
80 11.5 11.4 10.7 9.2 8.4
90 13.9 13.5 13.3 11.4 10.2
95 11.4 11.7 10.6 9.7 9.4
99 29.9 30.4 28.2 20.2 18.2
>99 98.8 109 105 118 103
Total 189 199 189 188 167
The numbers are calculated as the cross-sectional sum over all institutions within the respective
size group (see Table 1.1). Small loans (face value of 250,000 US$ or less) are reported in annual
frequency in Q2 until 2009, and in quarterly frequency from Q1 2010 onwards. The numbers
displayed are for Q2 of each respective year.
Table 1.2: Absolute Value of Small C&I Loans
Hence, the data from the FDIC CALL reports is a relatively precise measure
of small business loans, given the lack of availability of more comprehensive mea-
sures. Nevertheless, as a rough approximation of how foreign bank branches and
agencies may inﬂuence the dynamics of the series, Figure 1.7 shows the aggregate
C&I loan numbers obtained from the FDIC dataset together with a series that
includes foreign bank branches and agencies, based on the annual report of the
Federal Reserve Board Structure and Share Data for U.S. Banking Oﬃces of For-
eign Banking Organizations. As the report only provides data for aggregate C&I
loans, I am using the share of small C&I in total C&I loans obtained from the
CALL reports as a benchmark, to approximate the value of small C&I loans of
foreign bank branches and agencies. Even though the reduction in loans is more
pronounced, small C&I loans are still faring signiﬁcantly better than the total C&I
loans based on the CALL report data in 2008/2009.
The limited decrease in the aggregate value of small business loans could alter-
natively be explained by a general decrease in the face value of newly issued loans,
such that more loans would be classiﬁed as “small”. While this possibility cannot
be precluded, the group of banks, which belong to the 5 to 1% largest institutions
(95% to 99% percentile interval of the size distribution) shows, however, a sizable
decline in the value of outstanding small business loans10. Additionally, the other
size groups do not exhibit an absolute increase, whilst the reduction in their total
10Note that this is not due to the merger of Wachovia and Wells Fargo, as both banks belong
to the group of the 1% largest banks in the entire sample.
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Data on C&I loans of Foreign Banks’ Branches and Agencies is taken from the Federal Reserve
Board’s report on Structure and Share Data for U.S. Banking Oﬃces of Foreign Banking Or-
ganizations. Small C&I loans of Foreign Branches and Agencies are approximated by using the
share of small business loans to total C&I loans from the FDIC dataset multiplied with total
C&I loans of foreign branches and agencies. C&I loans of Foreign Branches and Agencies are
end of the year (Q4) data, but are treated as Q2 data to coincide with the CALL report ﬁling
dates on small business loans (Q2 from 1998 - 2011).
Figure 1.7: The Dynamics of Small C&I Loans
C&I lending is relatively modest. If a signiﬁcant trend towards smaller loan sizes
had indeed taken place, then one would expect to see an increase in both the share
of small loans and the absolute value.
A more serious shortcoming of the data is the aggregate nature of C&I loans,
even on a bank-individual basis. Firstly, it is unclear whether the relative stability
of outstanding loans can be ascribed to a renewal or extension of existing loans, or
to the supply of new loans11. Secondly, the dataset does not allow to distinguish
between commercial and industrial loans. It could still be the case, that loans to
manufacturing/industrial businesses have been cut down signiﬁcantly, whilst other
commercial businesses were able to secure additional funding.
Notwithstanding the shortcoming of the dataset as to the lack of information
about the receivers of the loans, there is no visible evidence for an overly pro-
nounced decline of loans to small businesses from the CALL report data. Even if
11The dataset does provide information on the number of outstanding loans, which is declining
more strongly than the outstanding amount. Still, this information is again ambiguous, as
businesses could have started to demand loans of relatively larger size, or, the number of very
small loans to very small businesses could have been reduced, in favor of slightly larger ﬁrms.
The CALL report data does not allow to determine the maturities of small business loans, either.
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smaller banks had indeed been hit harder by the recent ﬁnancial crisis, because
they did not receive direct government support like some of the largest banks, the
overall impact would have been relatively small, as the main part of small business
loans comes from the 1% largest banks. Those have indeed alleviated the reduc-
tions in small C&I lending and helped to partly insulate credit supply to small
businesses. Only recently, since 2010, a more pronounced decline in small business
loans is visible. Given that this deterioration happened 2 years after the height of
the crisis, a direct impact from the ﬁnancial turmoil is unlikely. A negative impact
of very low economic growth and rising default rates among small and medium
sized businesses is a more plausible explanation in this respect. Overall, the 5%
decline in small business C&I loans from Q2 2008 until Q2 2010 is rather small,
given the weak economic outlook at that time. In addition, as Figures 1.2 and 1.3
suggest, other forms of ﬁnance have held up relatively well. Overall, the evidence
for overly restrictive ﬁnancing conditions of small businesses is very limited.
1.3.2 Bank Capital
The lack of bank capital has been portrayed as the most severe problem of the
banking sector during the crisis. Figure 1.8 depicts the development of bank
capital ratios over time for several size groups. In general, larger banks work with
a higher leverage than smaller banks, but are still well capitalized. The minimum
core equity capital ratio according to the new Basel III proposals, including the
maximum amount of anti-cyclical capital buﬀers, is not more than 7%, which is well
below the observed averages. Core equity ratios were even increasing slightly until
Q3 2007. With the rise of default rates of mortgage backed securities starting at the
end of 2007, core equity ratios clearly declined across all size groups. Thereafter,
only the largest banks managed to increase their base capital ratios, both by
receiving direct capital injections from the government and by issuing new equity
in the market.
The picture for risk based capital (risk weighted Tier 1 + Tier 2 capital) looks
similar. The average capital ratios are way beyond the regulatory minimum of 8%
and the newly proposed Basel III risk based capital requirement, which does not
exceed 10.5%. It is striking, however, that although core equity ratios are rising
slightly for most size groups until Q3 2007, this is not the case for the risk based
capital ratios. This suggests that risk taking picked up and therefore the risk
weights for bank assets increased, leading to a lower risk-weighted capital ratio.
Notably, this is does not reﬂect the very optimistic ratings and calculated risks that
prevailed before Q3 2008. With more conservative risk estimates, the decrease in
risk based capital ratios would have looked much more severe. Moreover, the wave
of securitization from 2005-2008 led to outsourcing of relatively risky assets, which
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is not reﬂected at all on banks’ balance sheets12. If anything, a proper declaration
of oﬀ-balance sheet assets on banks’ balance sheets would have led to a further
reduction in the risk-based capital cushions. Whether it would have also led to
a reduction in core equity ratios is not fully clear, but it appears exaggerated
to assume that average capital ratios would be reduced to a level close to the
regulatory minimum.
Nonetheless, the aggregated average capital ratios are not necessarily the mea-
sure of interest in this respect. A small number of under-capitalized banks may
already be enough to cause serious problems in the banking sector. In this sense,
the tails of the capital ratio distribution are of greater interest than the simple av-
erages. Hence, to address any questions and arguments about under-capitalization,
a look into disaggregated data is pivotal.
And indeed, despite the relatively comfortable capital cushions of most banks,
a signiﬁcant number of deposit taking institutions experienced serious problems.
Figure 1.9 plots the share of institutions in the respective size group, which are
capital constrained. A capital constrained bank is deﬁned as an institution with
a core capital ratio of less than 6% and a total risk-based capital ratio of less
than 10%. Whereas the diﬃcult times in terms of capital for the 1% largest banks
started in Q3 2007, when problems with mortgage backed securities became ap-
parent and the ﬁrst Hedge-Funds had to close, the diﬃcult periods for smaller
institutions began with the collapse of Lehman Brothers in Q3 2008. Note that
around 15% (which is an absolute number of 9-10) of the largest banks had core
equity ratios below 6% at the end of 2007. The lower panel of Figure 1.9 depicts
the total shortfall of core equity relative to a 6% minimum ratio. The 2008 ﬁnan-
cial crisis clearly stands out, which is only partly explained by the growth of the
ﬁnancial sector in general.
Depending on the minimum core equity ratio used, the total shortfall in capital
can be enormous. Table 1.3 highlights, that in order to reach the future minimum
core equity ratio of 7% envisaged by Basel III, a ceteris paribus raise in equity of
currently $337bn would be required; most of it demanded by the medium sized
and larger institutions. The 1% largest institutions have, due to both government
support and equity issuances, been able to raise a signiﬁcant amount of capital
already, which puts them in a stronger position.
12See Brunnermeier (2009)
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The upper panel shows the average ratio of core equity over total assets, whereas the lower panel
depicts the average ratio of Tier 1 + Tier 2 capital over total risk adjusted assets. The averages
are calculated as the arithmetic average over all institutions within the respective size groups
in a given quarter. The size groups are classiﬁed as described in Table 1.1. For deﬁnitions see
Tables 1.4 and 1.5 in the Appendix.
Figure 1.8: Bank Capital Ratios
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The upper panel shows the share of capital constrained banks within the respective size group.
Banks are deﬁned as capital constrained if their core equity ratio is less than 6% and/or their
total risk-based capital ratio (ratio of Tier 1 + Tier 2 capital over total risk adjusted assets)
is less than 10%. The lower panel shows the sum of the shortfall of core equity of all capital
constrained banks towards a 6% minimum requirement, within the respective size groups. The
size groups are classiﬁed as described in Table 1.1. For deﬁnitions see Tables 1.4 and 1.5 in the
Appendix.
Figure 1.9: Capital Constrained Banks
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Min Core Equity Ratio
4.5% 5% 6% 7%
Q4 2007 6.4 8.5 154 791
Q4 2008 168 270 692 2179
Q4 2009 143 200 390 795
Q4 2010 111 151 257 485
Q2 2011 66.9 92.8 162 337
Capital shortfall in billion US dollar. The shortfall is calculated as the cross-sectional sum of
the shortfall of core equity of all capital constrained banks, relative to the respective Minimum
Core Equity Ratio given.
Table 1.3: Capital Shortfall in Billion US Dollar
Overall, the cross-section of bank capital suggests that the majority of institu-
tions had suﬃcient capital cushions. However, some individual institutions, which
obviously took on too much risk, suﬀered from a severe lack of capital during the
recent crisis and are still far short of fulﬁlling future regulatory minimum require-
ments. The largest institutions, which experienced the largest capital shortfalls,
managed to shore up their capital ratios after Q3 2008, whereas more than 5% of
all other banks are still short of equity, given their total assets.
1.3.3 Sources of Funding
Surprisingly, with the development of new debt instruments, the degree of non-
equity and non-deposit ﬁnancing (external ﬁnancing) has not increased, as Figure
1.10 illustrates. Larger banks have also a higher degree of external ﬁnance, but
there is clearly no visible upward trend, even for the 1% largest institutions. Espe-
cially, when external ﬁnancing excluding Fed Funds and Federal Home Loan Bank
(FHLB) advances is considered, the general trend is pointing downwards. Prior
to the recent crisis, from Q1 2006 until Q3 2007, external ﬁnancing ratios among
the larger 50% of institutions were indeed increasing, but the increases amount to
less than 5% of total liabilities on average. Overall, the external ﬁnancing ratios
are relatively low. Even the largest banks still rely to more than 70% on equity
and deposits for funding. Figure 1.11 visualizes the share of Fed Funds and FHLB
advances in total liabilities. In particular, the FHLB advances make up a larger
share of total liabilities during the crisis. Noteworthy is also the importance of the
Federal Home Loan Bank advances relative to Fed Funds (Figure 1.11).
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The upper panel shows the average ratios of non-equity and non-deposit liabilities over total lia-
bilities (external ﬁnancing ratio) within the respective size groups. The lower panel presents the
average ratios of non-equity and non-deposit liabilities without Fed Funds and FHLB advances
over total liabilities. The averages are calculated as the arithmetic average over all institutions
within the respective size groups in a given quarter. The size groups are classiﬁed as described
in Table 1.1. For deﬁnitions see Tables 1.4 and 1.5 in the Appendix.
Figure 1.10: External Financing Ratio
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The upper panel shows the average ratios of Fed Funds liabilities over total liabilities, whereas
the lower panel presents the average ratios of FHLB advances over total liabilities. The averages
are calculated as the arithmetic average over all institutions within the respective size groups
in a given quarter. The size groups are classiﬁed as described in Table 1.1. For deﬁnitions see
Tables 1.4 and 1.5 in the Appendix.
Figure 1.11: Fed Funds and FHLB Advances as a Share of Total Liabilities
20
Chapter 1 Facts and Myths about Banking Sector Weaknesses
The FHLB system is on average responsible for more funding than the Federal
Reserve; for institutions of all sizes13. It is also striking that, again, large institu-
tions rely to a greater extent on the aforementioned types of external ﬁnancing,
even though they are, in principle, accessible to all banks.
Hence, the general picture which emerges does not hint at an extreme increase
in the reliance on capital market funding, but does emphasize the de facto lender
of last resort functions of both the Federal Reserve and the Federal Home Loan
Bank system.
1.3.4 Liquidity
Banks’ liquidity ratios, as plotted in Figure 1.12, show a signiﬁcant downward trend
until Q3 2008. Large banks have signiﬁcantly less liquid balance sheets compared
to smaller institutions; especially when only government agency obligations are
counted towards liquid securities. In addition, they exhibit the largest declines in
liquidity ratios from 2003 until Q3 2008.
Whether the observed liquidity ratios are suﬃcient or too low depends on
several factors, most importantly the maturity of liabilities, which unfortunately
cannot be assessed with the underlying dataset. Nevertheless, the fact that after
Q3 2008 the amount of liquid assets jumped up and remained on a high level,
suggests that banks’ liquid asset ratios were insuﬃciently low. In addition, the
decline in the liquidity ratios suggest that in exchange for assets which can serve
as liquidity buﬀers, less liquid assets were purchased, which generally increases the
risk of default. In conjunction with the increased use of short-term liabilities like
commercial paper (see Brunnermeier (2009)), large banks appear quite vulnerable
to liquidity shocks. For the small institutions this seems less of a problem, as their
liquidity ratios are higher on average and they rely mainly on relatively stable
sources of funding like deposits, Fed Funds and FHLB advances (see previous
section).
The picture is more illustrative, when the percentage of institutions with crit-
ically low levels of liquidity is beheld (Figure 1.13). In Q3 2007, a quarter of the
1% largest institutions exhibited liquidity ratios of less than 5%, and over 16% had
liquidity ratios of less than 2%. In other words, if just 2% of the total liabilities
cannot be rolled over, then those institutions are technically insolvent.
13See Ashcraft et al. (2010) for a more formal analysis regarding the FHLB as a lender for
commercial banks and its role during the recent crisis.
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The upper panel shows the average ratio of cash balances + total securities over total assets. The
lower panel depicts the corresponding ratios, taking into account only government securities and
government backed agency obligations instead of total securities. The averages are calculated as
the arithmetic average over all institutions within the respective size groups in a given quarter.
The size groups are classiﬁed as described in Table 1.1. For deﬁnitions see Tables 1.4 and 1.5 in
the Appendix.
Figure 1.12: Liquidity Ratios
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The upper panel depicts the share of institutions in the respective size groups, which exhibit
a ratio of cash and government obligations over total assets (liquidity ratio) of less than 5%,
whereas the lower panel shows the equivalent share for institutions with a liquidity ratio of less
than 2%. The size groups are classiﬁed as described in Table 1.1. For deﬁnitions see Tables 1.4
and 1.5 in the Appendix.
Figure 1.13: Share of Institutions with Critically Low Liquidity Ratios
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Overall, quite a few banks display very low liquidity ratios, especially between
Q3 2007 and Q3 2008. The share of very large institutions with critical levels
of liquid assets is unprecedented in the sample, and it distinguishes the recent
crisis from the burst of the tech-bubble in 1999/2000. One possible explanation
for the extremely tight liquidity management by large banks is the availability of
short-term funding from the capital markets. If liquidity is readily available, then
holding very liquid and low yielding assets is not eﬃcient. On the other hand, this
greatly increases the risk of default and corroborates the view that banks’ business
models grew riskier and more vulnerable to adverse shocks in the ﬁnancial markets.
Since the data naturally covers only positions actually reported on the balance
sheet, the ultimate liquidity position, however, may look signiﬁcantly diﬀerent.
As both smaller and larger banks have removed signiﬁcant amounts of principally
illiquid mortgages from their balance sheets, either through securitization or sales
to government sponsored enterprises like Fannie May and Freddy Mac, the liquidity
risks were transferred to oﬀ-balance sheet vehicles and to government aﬃliated
institutions. For larger banks, which provided liquidity backstop guarantees to
their special purpose vehicles to which the relatively illiquid assets were laid oﬀ,
liquidity was even more scarce than it is already implied by the CALL report
data. This reinforces the general observation of very low liquidity ratios, especially
among larger banks.
1.3.5 Risk Taking
As risk taking is not directly observable, precise statements are diﬃcult to make.
Nevertheless, several indicators and proxies can give a comprehensive view of how
much risks banks took onto their balance sheets over time. One such proxy is
the ratio of loans to total assets (Figure 1.14). Loans carry a relatively high risk
of default compared to other assets, and they are not easily marketable and thus
not liquid. With the exception of the groups of the smallest and largest banks,
the share of loans in total assets clearly went up. The 1% to 5% largest banks
increased the share of loans by 10 percentage points from Q1 2003 until Q3 2008.
Notwithstanding the growth in total assets, the portfolio shift alone translates into
an increase in lending of more than 15%.
From this perspective, banks’ business models seem to have become notably
riskier, and the implied extra amount of supplied credit is substantial. Theoreti-
cally, the additional loans which were granted could have carried a lower or equal
probability of default, compared to the existing loan portfolio. As Figure 1.15 sug-
gests, ex-post this was not the case. Exactly those groups of banks, which more
aggressively increased their loan shares, have also suﬀered from higher default rates
on their credit portfolios. Given that the 1% largest banks have the highest ratio
of charge-oﬀs to loans over the whole sample, they obviously accumulated the loan
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portfolio with the highest risk of default. In general, the smaller banks seem to be
much more conservative in their lending decisions. Figure 1.16 corroborates this
view. Assuming that there is a trade-oﬀ between risk and return14, the enormously
high returns on equity, which the larger banks were able to generate until Q3 2007,
are a hint towards the excessively high risks they took, relatively to the amount
of core equity on their balance sheets.
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The graphs show the average ratio of total outstanding loans over total assets for the respective
size group. The averages are calculated as the arithmetic average over all institutions within the
respective size groups in a given quarter. The size groups are classiﬁed as described in Table 1.1.
For deﬁnitions see Tables 1.4 and 1.5 in the Appendix.
Figure 1.14: Ratio of Loans to Total Assets
14See Haldane et al. (2010) for evidence for a substantial trade-oﬀ between risk and return for
ﬁnancial institutions before and during the crisis.
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The upper panel shows the average ratios of the total face value of non-current loans over total
loans outstanding. The lower panel depicts the ratio of total eﬀective charge-oﬀs on loans over
total loans outstanding. The averages are calculated as the arithmetic average over all institutions
within the respective size groups in a given quarter. The size groups are classiﬁed as described
in Table 1.1. For deﬁnitions see Tables 1.4 and 1.5 in the Appendix.
Figure 1.15: Non-Current Loans and Charge-Oﬀs
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The upper panel shows the average net interest margins, whereas the lower panel depicts the
average return on equity. The averages are calculated as the arithmetic average over all insti-
tutions within the respective size groups in a given quarter. The size groups are classiﬁed as
described in Table 1.1. For deﬁnitions see Tables 1.4 and 1.5 in the Appendix.
Figure 1.16: Net Interest Margins and Returns on Equity
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Were these defaults expected? If banks expect a higher probability of default
on a loan, they normally demand a higher rate of interest as a compensation.
Figure 1.16, in contrast, shows that the net-interest margin banks charge does not
vary much over time or across size groups. It seems that the default risk, which
materialized with the crisis, was either not expected, or just not priced.
The average losses after Q3 2008 are very substantial for the larger banks and
are more than likely to have an inﬂuence on their lending behavior. The smaller
banks, on the other hand, did not suﬀer noteworthy losses on average.
1.4 Conclusion
Despite the tentative evidence of a decline in bank loans to Non-Corporates based
on the aggregate data, and tightening credit standards from the Chief Loan Oﬃcer
Survey, there is no evidence for a signiﬁcant decline in small C&I loans. Assuming
that small loans also ﬂow to small businesses, the ﬁrst claim that small ﬁrms
experienced a sizable “credit-crunch” cannot be upheld. In addition, the bulk of
small loans is issued by the largest 1% of banks, which disproves the central role
of small banks for the provision of small business loans. Also, small banks were
not hit harder by the crisis than larger institutions. Rather the contrary seems
to be the case, as the descriptive evidence regarding capital ratios and risk taking
suggests that small banks, on average, were more conservative and hence had
relatively minor problems with delinquent loans.
The second claim, that banks in general exhibited insuﬃcient capital ratios,
cannot be conﬁrmed either. Large banks did have lower capital ratios than small
banks, but on average, capital ratios before and during the crisis seemed suﬃ-
cient. However, some individual institutions suﬀered from a serious shortage of
capital during the recent crisis. In total, around 5% of all institutions still seem
under-capitalized, which is less severe than in the period after the burst of the
“tech bubble” in 1999/2000. Still, the implicit demand of additional capital or
requirements to deleverage in light of the new Basel III regulations are enormous.
An increased reliance on capital market funding cannot be detected in the
CALL report data. Even the 1% largest institutions on average rely to more than
70% on equity and deposits as sources of funding. Striking is the importance
of FHLB advances, which are responsible for a greater share in total liabilities
than Fed Funds. This is clearly distorted by the fact that banks have moved
signiﬁcant amounts of assets oﬀ-balance sheet. Nevertheless, the largest part of
banks’ liabilities is constituted by equity and deposits, even after the collapse of
many special purpose vehicles.
The last two claims, on the other hand, seem more plausible. Indeed, the
amount of liquid assets on banks balance sheets was relatively low and a signiﬁcant
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downward trend up until Q3 2007 can be observed. Particularly, the largest banks
had such low liquidity ratios, that the inability to roll over even a small part of
their liabilities, would have most likely meant insolvency in the absence of the
extraordinary liquidity provisions by the Federal Reserve.
Finally, there is ample evidence for increased risk taking up until Q3 2007.
Again, the largest institutions are the main propagators of this trend. Accordingly,
those banks suﬀered also the largest losses, whereas the losses incurred by the
smaller banks were relatively minor.
Overall, the facts about balance sheet weaknesses which prevail among the
myths are, that both poor liquidity and risk management, mainly of the large
institutions, resulted in substantial problems and losses. Troubles with oﬀ-balance
sheet vehicles, which required liquidity injections and ultimately forced lower-
quality assets back onto banks’ balance sheets, will have put additional pressure
on reﬁnancing needs and write-downs.
To determine whether these factors are the main causes for the adverse impact
of the ﬁnancial crisis on the real economy, necessarily requires a more structural
approach, which will be taken in the next chapter of this thesis. Nevertheless, the
ﬁndings from individual bank data suggest that liquidity mismatches and height-
ened risk-taking are relevant catalysts, or even triggers, of the ﬁnancial crisis 2007-
2009.
Data Appendix
The dataset contains the CALL report data on all FDIC insured deposit taking
institutions in the US. It covers both commercial banks under federal and state
charter, including institutions which are not member of the FDIC, and savings
banks and savings associations. It does not, however, cover branches and agencies
of foreign bank oﬃces (FBO’s), which are signiﬁcant suppliers of credit in the
US. In the last decade they were responsible for up to 8,6% of total bank lending
and up to 21.1% of C&I loans of all commercial banks in the last decade. At
the peak in 2007, they held 15.6% of total assets. Foreign branches and agencies
are mostly not FDIC insured, so they are not included in the dataset here. In
particular, for the analysis of small business loans this poses a problem, as the
actual lending ﬁgures might diﬀer signiﬁcantly when FBO’s are included. Foreign
banks’ branches and agencies do ﬁle a so called FFIEC 002 form15, which however
does not cover most of the items analyzed here. In particular, the FFIEC 002 form
only require insured institutions to provide data on small business lending. These,
however, are already covered by the FDIC dataset. To get an impression of the
15See http://www.ﬃec.gov/forms002.htm for all the series covered.
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sensitivity of the results with respect to the inclusion of the FFIEC 002 data, I
use the aggregate ﬁgures provide by the Federal Reserve16 at annual frequency.
For the analysis of bank balance sheet characteristics like equity and liquidity
ratios, and loan ratios, or return on equity, the inclusion of the data for foreign
bank oﬃces is problematic. Usually, these are highly depending on their foreign
parents and in this sense, any of the measures under consideration are likely to be
of limited information content, notwithstanding the restriction that only a very
limited number of balance sheet items are reported. Hence, the concentration on
all FDIC insured institutions in the US seems sensible in this context, and still
conveys a fairly representative view of the banking sector as a whole.
The FDIC dataset includes some implausible data-points, which are removed
from the dataset. These are institutions which exhibit zero or negative total assets,
total loans, core equity or total risk based capital. Tables 1.4 and 1.5 presents a
deﬁnition of the variables used in this paper, together with the corresponding
FDIC variable names. The FDIC assigns a variable name to all positions in the
CALL reports, which I refer to as FDIC codes. The dataset is assembled from the
quarterly .zip ﬁles obtained by using the download all available report options in all
report categories option on the Statistics on Depository Institutions (SDI) website
http://www2.fdic.gov/sdi/17. Each of the .zip ﬁles contains all available reports
and balance sheet items for all institutions in a given quarter in .csv format and a
readme.html ﬁle, which contains the corresponding variable names. To merge all
quarters into a panel, the FDIC certiﬁcate number (FDIC code: cert) serves as
the unique identiﬁer of an individual institution.
16Available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/iba/
17The option can be found under SDI Map, Deﬁnitions Data Download->Data Download-
>download all
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Chapter 2
The Cross-Section of Bank Balance
Sheets and Macroeconomic Factors
of Aggregate Credit Supply
2.1 Introduction
What drives aggregate bank lending? During the ﬁnancial crisis 2007-2009 in par-
ticular, this has been an issue of utmost relevance for policy makers and regulators.
Despite the extensive rescue packages from the US Treasury department and the
extraordinary low reﬁnancing costs put in place by the Federal Reserve, aggregate
bank lending in the US declined substantially. Bank balance sheet weaknesses,
such as insuﬃcient capital cushions as well as excessive risk taking, have been
widely blamed for the apparent lack of banks’ credit supply, spurring an overhaul
of banking regulation. At the same time however, the macroeconomic environment
deteriorated signiﬁcantly. The disruption on the ﬁnancial markets had adverse ef-
fects on the perceived risk in the ﬁnancial sector, making it diﬃcult for banks
to reﬁnance themselves. Further, expectations regarding future economic growth
were strongly revised and concomitantly expected loan default rates rose. Natu-
rally, this severely restricted banks in their capacity to supply credit, even though
previously, bank balance sheets were under no sign of stress.
The aim of this paper is to shed light on the importance of bank balance sheet
characteristics for banks’ lending decisions in the aggregate and the dependency of
those decisions on the state of the macroeconomy and ﬁnancial market conditions.
Individual banks’ lending decisions are made on the basis of their balance sheet
characteristics, given current and expected economic conditions. Most empirical
studies on the so-called bank lending channel, the eﬀect of bank balance sheet
characteristics on lending decisions, focus on the transmission mechanism of mon-
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etary policy. The eﬀect of monetary policy on bank lending is then measured at
the bank with average balance sheet characteristics, such as equity or liquidity.
This study goes one step further by using a coherent aggregation procedure over
the full distribution of individual banks to provide a measure for the importance
of a wide range of balance sheet characteristics for aggregate lending. Even though
my estimation is unrestricted in a sense that the setup does not preimpose the
aggregate lending estimate to match observed aggregate lending in any way, the
dynamics of aggregate lending can be matched with precision. This allows me
to introduce a variance decomposition of aggregate lending - the taxonomy of
bank balance sheet characteristics - by measuring how much of the variation in
aggregate lending can be explained by the impact of diﬀerences in balance sheet
characteristics (BCs) on lending decisions across banks. Whereas the variation
in the balance sheet characteristics themselves cannot explain even a small part
of the variance of aggregate lending, the bulk of the variance contribution stems
from the variation in lending sensitivities with respect to the BCs, such as banks’
core equity ratios. The second step is then to determine to which extent lending
sensitivities are driven by macroeconomic and ﬁnancial factors over time. A bank
with a high core equity ratio for example has a greater capacity to absorb losses
on its lending portfolio than a bank with low amounts of equity capital relative to
its total assets. How severe this restriction is for their respective lending decisions,
and eventually for observed aggregate bank lending, however, depends on common
factors, such as expected economic growth, since with higher growth the default
risks on banks’ loan portfolios abate. The analysis here extends previous studies
by looking at a more comprehensive set of macroeconomic (common) factors, such
as expectations about future macroeconomic conditions and ﬁnancial market risk.
The empirical literature on bank lending has established a variety of bank bal-
ance sheet variables which aﬀect banks’ lending supply conditional upon common
macroeconomic factors, with a particular focus on monetary policy. Since bank
lending over time will be also driven by demand, a fundamental identiﬁcation
problem of supply versus demand arises. To make progress on this issue, the lit-
erature has been utilizing bank-individual balance sheet data. The idea is that at
one point in time, banks with stronger balance sheets have a higher credit supply
capacity, and therefore the cross-sectional variation in observed lending growth
identiﬁes how sensitive lending decisions are with respect to various BCs. Im-
plicitly, it is assumed that bank-individual characteristics pin down credit supply
decisions, whereas the factors driving demand are common to at least a group of
banks. Kashyap and Stein (2000) document the existence of a ’bank lending chan-
nel’ of monetary policy in the US. When monetary policy tightens, banks with a
higher share of liquid assets on their balance sheets can better compensate a loss
of insured deposit ﬁnancing by simply drawing down on their existing fungible
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securities. This eﬀect is stronger for smaller banks, which are more dependent on
deposits as a source of funding. Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004) argue that, in
addition, cross-sectional diﬀerences in risk-adjusted bank capital levels matter. In-
stitutions with a stronger capital base can more easily tap the alternative markets
for funding and regulatory restrictions on capital are less binding. Based on a sam-
ple of Italian banks, they ﬁnd that banks with larger capital buﬀers can smooth
lending better in response to both monetary policy and GDP shocks. Kishan and
Opiela (2000, 2006) establish the relevance of a bank capital channel for the US
and ﬁnd asymmetric eﬀects in the propagation of monetary policy. Contractionary
policies are most eﬀective on bank lending for low-capital banks, expansionary poli-
cies however are close to ineﬀective for this group. Ashcraft (2006) ﬁnds that the
eﬀect of Monetary Policy on bank lending in the US is quantitatively signiﬁcant
only for ﬁnancially distressed banks, whereas being a member of a multi-bank
holding can insulate against changes in interest rates for the average bank. In
the light of ﬁnancial innovation and the entailing change in banks business mod-
els, Altunbas et al. (2009) argue that the enormous growth in securitization in
the Euro area has altered the liquidity, credit and maturity transformation role
traditionally performed by its banks. As illiquid loans can be moved oﬀ the bal-
ance sheet, shortages in liquidity or capital can be overcome without aﬀecting the
supply of credit. They ﬁnd evidence for a weaker inﬂuence of Monetary Policy on
bank lending for banks with higher securitization activities. Altunbas et al. (2010)
turn to the liability side and point to the perception of risk by ﬁnancial markets
as a criterion for banks capability to raise new funds, especially as the reliance on
ﬁnancing through capital markets has increased. Their results indicate that low-
risk banks oﬀer a larger amount of credit and can shield their lending better from
monetary policy shocks as well as economic slowdowns. Accordingly, Cornett et
al. (2011) present evidence that US banks with more stable sources of funding like
core deposits and equity capital, continued to lend relative to other banks during
the ﬁnancial crisis 2007-2009. Ashcraft et al. (2010) emphasize the importance
of the FHLB system as a lender of next to last resort for banks in the crisis and
Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) show that the spike in commercial and industrial
loans following the collapse of Lehman Brothers was due to a simultaneous run by
borrowers, who drew down on their existing credit lines.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. Firstly, it derives a taxonomy of
bank balance sheet factors for aggregate bank lending for a wide range of BCs of
interest, whereas most of the literature focuses on the eﬀect of particular BCs in
the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. At each point in time, the lending
sensitivity with respect to the various BCs is measured. The cross-section is then
aggregated up consistently to calculate the variance contribution of the BCs to
aggregate bank sector lending over time. This allows a comparison of the impacts
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of the BCs relative to each other. In this sense, it sheds light on the balance sheet
strengths and weaknesses which are constitutive for the banking system’s capacity
to supply credit before and during the recent ﬁnancial crisis. Secondly, it looks
at a broader set of macroeconomic factors, which are likely to inﬂuence lending
sensitivities. Besides monetary policy and macroeconomic activity, the eﬀects of
expected macroeconomic conditions as well as ﬁnancial market risks are analyzed.
Indeed, expected rather than current macroeconomic conditions appear to play a
signiﬁcant role for the dynamics of aggregate lending decisions of small banks.
The next section presents the econometric model, the underlying dataset and
the results of the cross-sectional estimation. Section 2.3 comprises the analysis
of the relevant macroeconomic and ﬁnancial factors and their impact on lending
sensitivities. The ﬁnal section concludes.
2.2 Bank Balance Sheet Characteristics and Ag-
gregate Lending
To analyze how sensitive bank lending is to diﬀerences in banks’ balance sheet
characteristics at a given point in time, I pursue the method used by Kashyap
and Stein (2000) and run the following repeated cross-section regression for every
t separately:
gLi,t = μt +
J∑
j=1
βj,tBC (j)i,t−1 + εi,t (2.1)
with
BCt−1 =
[
Eqt−1 exc T ier2t−1 Constrt−1 Risk wtt−1 NIMt−1
Duet−1 Liqt−1 Holdt ExtF int−1 SecActt−1
FedFundst−1 FHLBt−1 NI Inct−1 UCt
]
and BC (j) the jth element of the vector of balance sheet characteristics BC.
Table 2.1 contains a deﬁnitions of all the factors. Lending growth on the left hand
side is net of interbank loans and loss allowances. The indices i and t denote the
individual bank i and the quarterly time period t respectively.
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Variable Deﬁnition
gLi,t Quarterly loan growth rate. gLi,t =
Li,t−Li,t−1
Li,t−1
where Li,t are an individual institution’s
loans and leases net of loss allowances and interbank loans. Interbank loans are deﬁned
as loans to commercial banks in the US, to US branches of foreign banks
and other depository institutions in the US. (FDIC: Li,t = lnlsnett − lndepact)
Eq Core equity ratio. Bank equity capital (common stock, perpetual preferred stock,
surplus and undivided proﬁts) relative to total assets. (FDIC: eq/asset)
exc T ier2 Tier2 risk weighted capital ratio in excess of the regulatory minimum of 8%.
(FDIC: rbcrwaj − 8%)
Constr Dummy for capital constrained institutions. All institutions with equity ratios below 6%
or Tier2 capital ratios below 10%. (FDIC: eq/asset ∗ 100 < 6 or rbcrwaj < 10)
Risk wt Risk weighting. Risk weighted assets/total assets. (FDIC: rwaj/asset)
NIM Net interest margin. Total interest income less total interest expense
relative to earning assets. (FDIC: nimy)
Due Ratio of past due and non-accrual assets to total assets.
(FDIC: (p3asset+ p9asset+ naasset)/lnlsnet)
Liq Ratio of liquid assets to total assets. Liquid assets are cash balances,
trading assets, Fed Fund repos, and government-backed securities.
(FDIC: (chbal + trad+ frepo+ scus+ scage+ scmuni)/asset)
Hold Dummy for member of a Bank Holding. (FDIC: namehcr exists)
ExtF in External ﬁnancing ratio. Ratio of non-equity, non-deposit ﬁnancing to total liabilities.
(FDIC:(liabeq − dep− eq)/liabeq)
SecAct Securitization activity. Reported securitization of loans/total assets.
(FDIC:(szlnres+ szlnhel + szlncrcd+ szlauto+ szlncon+ szlnci+ szlnoth)/asset)
FedFunds Ratio of fed funds purchased and repurchase agreements to total assets.
(FDIC: frepp/asset)
FHLB Ratio of FHLB (Federal Housing Loan Bank System) advances to total assets.
(FDIC: othbfhlb/asset)
NI Inc Non-interest income relative to total assets. Non-interest income is deﬁned
as trading account gains + securities gains + additional non-interest income.
(FDIC: (iglsec+ igltrad+ idothnii) /asset)
UC Relative change in unused commitments: unused loan commitmentst
loans and leasest
− unused loan commitmentst−1
loans and leasest−1
.
(FDIC: uclnt
lnlsnett
− uclnt−1
lnlsnett−1
)
All ratios and growth rates are expressed in %. FDIC gives the corresponding variable codes for
the FDIC database.
Table 2.1: Deﬁnitions of Bank Characteristics (BC)
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Hence, the OLS estimation results in a set of parameter estimates (μ, β) for each
period t. All variables on the right hand side are lagged by one quarter to avoid a
contemporaneous endogeneity of lending growth and balance sheet characteristics
1. The resulting β -estimates represent the sensitivity of lending growth with
respect to the corresponding BC at time t. The more of a restriction, for example,
core equity is at a given point in time, the higher is the ceteris paribus eﬀect of
an additional unit of Eq on lending growth across individual banks, and therefore
the greater the corresponding β1,t. The lending sensitivities are likely to vary over
time as the macroeconomic environment changes. The coeﬃcients βt are estimated
in the cross-section and hence at a given state of the economy. Note that the βt’s
are totally unrestricted in their movement over time, as there is no preimposed
relationship between the cross-sections among the quarterly time periods t.
The quantitative eﬀect for aggregate lending growth is derived by consistently
summing up both sides of the equation to
gLagg,t = μt + β2,t
∑
i
ωi,t−1Eqi,t−1
+
J∑
j=3
βj,t
∑
i
ωi,t−1BC (j)i,t−1 +
∑
i
ωi,t−1εi,t (2.2)
where the weights ωi,t−1 =
Li,t−1∑
i Li,t−1
are chosen to yield aggregate lending growth
(within the respective size group) on the left hand side2. The total impact on
aggregate lending, of say the core capital restriction, is then
β1,t
∑
i
ωi,t−1Eqi,t−1
1See Kashyap and Stein (2000), Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004), Ashcraft (2006), and Al-
tunbas et al. (2009) among others. Given that banks de-facto practice a very timely balance
sheet management (see for example Adrian and Shin (2010)), it seems realistic to assume that
next quarter’s lending decisions do not feed back to the current period’s value of balance sheet
characteristics. Hold and is not lagged, as this dummy variable is to indicate whether a bank
is a holding company in the current time period. UC is also a contemporaneous value, since it
is supposed to capture the part in current lending growth, which is induced by a draw-down on
unused loan commitments/credit lines from existing borrowers.
2
∑
i
ωi,t−1gLi,t =
∑
i
ωi,t−1
Li,t − Li,t−1
Li,t−1
=
∑
i
Li,t−1∑
i Li,t−1
Li,t − Li,t−1
Li,t−1
=
∑
i Li,t −
∑
i Li,t−1∑
i Li,t−1
≡ gLagg,t
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and hence consists of two parts: the sensitivity of lending growth with respect to
core capital in period t measured by β1,t, and the lending weighted level of core eq-
uity capital in the banking sector given by
∑
i ωi,t−1Eqi,t−1, which will be referred
to as the bank sector level. The tighter this restriction is in the cross-section,
the larger is the corresponding β and thus the impact on aggregate lending. If
the restriction is equally tight, but at higher levels of Eq, then the restriction is
even more binding in an absolute sense and, hence, core equity capital is quanti-
tatively even more important for lending decisions in the aggregate. The tighter
the restriction, the stronger is the impact on aggregate lending.
Given the aggregate eﬀects for each t, the ﬁrst main question of this paper can
be addressed, namely, how important are the BCs for aggregate lending dynamics?
For this purpose, I calculate the share of the variance of aggregate lending which
is explained by the total impact of BC (j):
var share gLagg (j) ≡
cov
(
gLagg,t, βj,t
∑
i ωi,t−1BC (j)i,t−1
)
var (gLagg,t)
(2.3)
with μt included as the case when BC (j = 0)i,t = 1 and β0,t = μt ∀ i, t.
Since
var (gLagg,t) = cov (gLagg,t, gLagg,t) =
J∑
j=0
cov
(
gLagg,t, βj,t
∑
i
ωi,t−1BC (j)i,t−1
)
+error
it follows that3
∑
j
var share gLagg (j) =
∑
j cov
(
gLagg,t, βj,t
∑
i ωi,t−1BC (j)i,t−1
)
var (gLagg,t)
≈ 1
Hence, if the aggregate error term
∑
i ωi,t−1εi,t is small (see section (2.2.3.2))
in all periods t, then the variance share in equation (2.3) can be interpreted as the
percentage share of a balance sheet restriction j in the time variation in aggregate
bank lending decisions.
3The approximate equality comes from the fact that
var (gLagg,t) =
∑J
j=0 cov (gLagg,t, βj,t
∑
i ωi,t−1BC (j)) + cov (gLagg,t,
∑
i ωi,t−1εi,t)
and thus∑J
j=0 var share gLagg (j) =
∑
j cov(gLagg,t,βj,t
∑
i ωi,t−1BC(j)i,t−1)
var(gLagg,t)
= 1− cov(gLagg,t,
∑
i ωi,t−1εi,t)
var(gLagg,t)
.
Given that
cov(gLagg,t,
∑
i ωi,t−1εi,t)
var(gLagg,t)
is small, as shown below, it follows that∑J
j=0 var share gLagg (j) ≈ 1.
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2.2.1 Data
The data for this analysis is taken from the quarterly US CALL reports from Q1
2002 until Q2 2010 for all FDIC insured institutions as published on the FDIC
website4. The raw data features some outliers and implausible values, which have
to be excluded in order to avoid undesirable biases. Details can be found in the
Appendix. Starting from an average of around 8,700 observations, it reduces the
dataset to around 7,750 observations on average per quarter5.
The dataset is divided into two size groups, the 95% quantile and the top
5% of the size distribution6. For each of the size groups, the regressions are run
separately, as small banks and large banks are likely to diﬀer in their respective
lending sensitivities for three reasons7. Firstly, they have a diﬀerent level of access
to capital market funding for both equity and debt8. As Figure 2.1 shows, the share
of external funding in total liabilities is signiﬁcantly higher, while non-equity and
non-deposit ﬁnancing of the small banks is almost entirely raised through Fed
Funds and FHLB advances. In addition, Table 2.2 indicates that a far bigger
share of large banks is engaged in securitization activities (over 11% of large banks
compared with less than 1% of small banks prior to Q3 2008) and those activities
on average amount to a larger share of total assets (12% compared to 7% for the
smaller institutions before the crisis, and 11% compared to 6% thereafter). This
can provide a greater ﬂexibility for issuing new loans, even in cases when capital
and liquidity ratios are not very high (Altunbas et al. (2009)). Secondly, their
business models have become increasingly diﬀerent. Large banks tend to have
larger Investment Banking departments. In good times, this can substantially
contribute to their revenue and therefore increase lending capacity, whereas during
downturns this eﬀect can work strongly into the opposite direction. Thirdly, large
4The data is publicly available for download at http://www2.fdic.gov/sdi/. The database
does not include Oﬃces and Branches of foreign banks. See the Appendix for a discussion.
5All calculated statistics, time series and results in the paper are based upon this stratiﬁed
dataset.
6This yields an average of around 370 observations per quarter for the large banks group,
which enables suﬃciently precise estimates in the cross-sectional econometric analysis. The
upper 5% of the size distribution are responsible for more than 80% of aggregate lending. As
the focus of this analysis is on the relevance of cross-sectional restrictions for aggregate lending,
a further slicing of the group of small banks has little eﬀect, as in any case it represents less than
a quarter of aggregate lending already. The size groups are recalculated at every quarter.
7As the diﬀerences in size are likely to aﬀect the lending sensitivities itself rather than lending
growth directly, it seems appropriate to divide the dataset into diﬀerent groups. Furthermore, the
eﬀect the ’size eﬀect’ on lending growth is potentially highly non-linear. Consequently, simply
adding total assets as a right hand side variable may not take account for the compounded
non-proportional eﬀect of size.
8A better access to capital markets can reﬂect a size and cost advantage regarding capital
increases and bond issuance only, but may also include a ’too big to fail’ eﬀect.
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The 3D bars show the average External Financing Ratio (non-equity and non-deposit ﬁnancing
relative to total liabilities) for institutions within the given size percentile interval. The utmost
left bar thus shows the average External Financing Ratio of the smallest 10% of all institutions
for each quarter from Q1 2001 until Q3 2009. The bar at the 20 percentile represents the average
of all institutions which are among the 20% largest institutions, but are larger than the 10%
smallest banks. The right graph plots the External Financing Ratio without Fed Funds and
FHLB liabilities.
Figure 2.1: External Financing Ratios
and small banks have a diﬀerent costumer base. Small Loans in Table 2.2 denote
the value weighted share of small loans9, indicating that large banks typically also
grant larger loans. Assuming that larger loans on average are assigned to larger
ﬁrms or richer individuals, a diﬀerential response in demand across bank size could
occur, as larger ﬁrms, for example, are less dependent on bank credit and may also
be able to better weather economic diﬃculties, as they are more diversiﬁed.
9Small loans are deﬁned here as loans with a value of $250k or less. This includes loans secured
by nonfarm nonresidential properties, C&I loans to US addressees, loan secured by farmland and
loans to ﬁnance agricultural production. The share of small loans is calculated as small loans
relative to the total amount of loans in the corresponding categories.
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2.2.2 Balance Sheet Characteristics
As the aim of this paper is to analyze a comprehensive set of balance sheet char-
acteristics, both well-established characteristics from the literature and a number
of additional variables are employed, to capture the speciﬁcs of the recent crisis.
The right hand side variables in equation (2.1) can be subsumed into 5 groups:
1. Bank capital: Eq, exc T ier2, Constr
2. Risk: Risk wt, NIM, Due
3. Liquidity and Financing: Liq, Hold, Ext F in, SecAct, FedFunds, FHLB
4. Non-interest income: NI Inc
5. ’Demand’ factors: μ, UC
Table 2.2 provides some summary statistics. Bank capital here is comprised of
both, the core equity ratio (Eq) and the excess Tier2 capital ratio (exc T ier2),
which reﬂect diﬀerent types of capital reserves. Whereas core equity is a measure
for the pure loss absorbing capacity of a bank, the Tier2 capital ratio is risk
weighted to make the capital reserves comparable among institutions with diﬀerent
risk proﬁles10. Foremost, the Tier2 capital ratio is a regulatory restriction. As
the time-constant regulatory risk weights may not reﬂect the perception of risk
of a bank, especially in a changing macroeconomic environment, Tier2 capital
cannot reﬂect the total eﬀect of the capital restriction. Core equity, particularly
in crisis times, contains additional valuable information on how binding the equity
capital restriction is for lending decisions. Getting very close to the constraints can
severely limit an institution’s capacity to obtain funding, and it may, in the worst
case, lead to regulatory actions, such as a complete shut-down of a distressed bank’s
lending business. Once banks come very close to the constraint, the expected costs
10In the time period under consideration, US banks were regulated according to the BASEL
I framework, under which banks have to hold at least 8% Tier2 capital relative to their risk
weighted assets. The excess Tier2 capital ratio (exc T ier2) is simply the Tier2 risk weighted
capital ratio minus the regulatory minimum of 8 %. Under Basel I, the risk weights are constant
and ﬁxed for a given asset class. Loans receive the full risk weights whereas for example Treasury
Bills and loan commitments carry a zero weighting. Tier 2 capital equals common capital stock
plus qualiﬁed perpetual preferred stock (= Tier 1 capital) plus supplementary capital, which is
categorized as undisclosed reserves, revaluation reserves, general provisions, hybrid instruments
and subordinated term debt. For details see http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc111.pdf
In addition, US banking regulation imposes a minimum core equity ratio (Eq). The eﬀec-
tive minimum depends on a banks CAMELS (Capital Adequacy, Asset Quality, M anagement,
Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to Market Risk) rating, which is an undisclosed rating con-
ducted by the responsible regulator. Banks with the best possible rating of 1 required a minimum
core capital ratio of at least 4% until Q4 2010.
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are likely to explode11. Accordingly, most bank balance sheets exhibit capital
buﬀers12 to insure against such cases. To take account for extreme cases, I use
a dummy (Constr) for institutions which have a Tier 2 capital ratio below 10%
(exc T ier2 < 2%) or a core equity ratio below 6%.
The second group of variables captures the riskiness of a bank’s loan portfolio.
The literature so far has emphasized the implications of risk taking on the reﬁ-
nancing ability of a ﬁnancial institution and therefore has analyzed the eﬀects of
perceived risk by the capital markets on lending activity (Altunbas et al. (2010)).
The analysis here, however, is concerned with the taxonomy of bank balance sheet
characteristics as a ﬁrst step, and therefore focuses on the risk of an institution’s
asset portfolio. To capture at least some of the eﬀect of risk on credit supply ca-
pacity, three variables serve as proxies: The Basel I risk weight (Risk wt), the net
interest margin (NIM), and the amount of over-due loans relative to total gross
loans (Due). Whereas Due is rather an ex-post measure of risk, both Risk wt and
NIM are arguably more forward looking. Even though the Basel I risk weight
cannot distinguish ex-ante between more and less risky loans or securities, it still
provides relevant information about the riskiness of an institution’s business model.
For example, if an institution’s assets consist only of Treasury Bills, then the risk
factor would be equal to zero, whereas if the asset side is comprised only by loans,
this factor equals one. The idea behind the net interest margin is, that on average
banks which take on loans with a higher perceived risk, should charge a higher
markup on their loan rates to cover the relatively higher expected costs of loan
defaults.
In addition to the well-established characteristics like Liq (Kashyap and Stein
(2000))13, Hold (Ashcraft (2006)) and SecAct (Altunbas et al. (2009)), which
measure the eﬀects of liquidity and ﬁnancing on credit supply, three more variables
are introduced. ExtF in, on the one hand, is consistent with the idea that banks
with better access to capital markets have ceteris paribus more ﬂexibility in taking
on new loans. A higher ratio of non-equity and non-deposit ﬁnancing is taken as a
signal for better access to external funding sources, given that deposit and equity
ﬁnancing is more diﬃcult to obtain and is likely to be more expensive.
11see van den Heuvel (2007)
12This is also an outcome of theoretical models with uncertainty in default rates or loan demand
(Zicchino (2006), Van den Heuvel (2007)). Banks hold a capital buﬀer in the optimum as an
insurance against a rise in default rates, or as a buﬀer for unexpected spikes in loan demand.
13The liquidity ratio Liq is deﬁned slightly diﬀerently. Here, only cash balances, the trading
account, Fed Fund repos and government-backed securities are considered liquid assets. Usually,
the literature uses total security holdings and not just government-backed securities in addition
to the aforementioned components. For the period under consideration, especially from 2008
until 2009, this deﬁnition appears to be too wide, since most securitized loans and mortgages
were hardly salable.
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Pre-Crisis Crisis Pre-Crisis Crisis
(Q1 ’01 - Q2 ’08) (Q3 ’08 - Q2 ’10) (Q1 ’01 - Q2 ’08) (Q3 ’08 - Q2 ’10)
Small Top 5% Small Top 5% Small Top 5% Small Top 5%
gL 2.6 2.6 1.1 -0.15 ExtF in 6.5 15.9 6.7 13.7
(6.3) (5.6) (5.9) (5.9) (6.7) (9.5) (6.5) (8.4)
gLagg 2.6 2.3 0.49 -0.21 Sec act 7.3 12.2 5.8 10.6
Small Loans 42.5 12.3 33.5 9.9 (18.1) (26.7) (17.1) (20.4)
Eq 10.6 9.3 10.7 9.6 0.546 11.5 1.0 8.5
(3.5) (2.8) (3.7) (2.7) FedFunds 3.1 5.8 2.9 4.6
ExcT ier2 9.2 5.6 8.8 5.7 (3.2) (4.5) (3.0) (3.7)
(8.2) (5.2) (7.9) (5.0) 36.9 80.6 34.8 79.0
Constr 1.9 3.7 4.0 7.4 FHLB 7.3 9.5 7.4 8.2
Risk wt 67.8 71.8 69.5 73.7 (6.0) (7.6) (5.7) (6.7)
(13.3) (13.4) (12.9) (12.8) 60.6 86.0 65.3 89.2
NIM 4.1 3.7 3.8 3.4 NI Inc 0.264 0.561 0.215 0.407
(0.9) (0.9) (0.8) (0.9) (0.6) (1.0) (0.6) (0.9)
Due 1.4 1.1 2.7 3.4 UC 0.042 0.091 -0.393 -0.526
(1.3) (1.0) (2.6) (2.8) (4.3) (5.2) (3.8) (4.5)
Liq 45.4 40.2 41.3 35.5 rel to Loans 16.5 36.8 13.9 29.7
(26.0) (22.8) (25.2) (20.5) NoObs 199189 10500 53620 2825
Hold 72.5 74.3 73.8 76.3 p.Q. 7114 375 6703 353
All values are expressed in % per quarter. Variable deﬁnitions can be found in Table 2.1. All
summary statistics and size cut-oﬀs are calculated based upon the stratiﬁed sample described in
section 2.2.1 as arithmetic means across institutions and quarters. The numbers in brackets are
the corresponding standard deviations. Small denotes all institutions within the lower 95% of
the total asset distribution, while Top 5% comprises the upper 5% of the total asset distribution
in the sample. Small Loans is the value weighted share of loans smaller than $250k in total
loans. Constr and Hold are the average percentage of institutions which are capital constrained
or belong to a Multi-Bank Holding, respectively. UC rel to Loans takes the total value of unused
commitments for each institution and divides it by the value of total net loans (net of charge-
oﬀs). The statistics for the Sec act , Fed Funds and FHLB are calculated conditional on the
observations being non-zero. Correspondingly, Obs p.Q. are the average number of non-zero
observations per quarter. The last two lines (NoObs and p.Q.) provide the total number of
observations and the average number of observations per quarter within the respective the time
period and size group.
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics
Both FedFunds and FHLB are owed to the extraordinary liquidity shortages
during the recent crisis. As Fed Funds carry a stigma as a source of funding
(Furﬁne (2001)), because other forms of ﬁnancing like unsecured interbank lending
are cheaper, higher ratios of funding through Fed Funds, of which the Federal
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Reserve has supplied enormous amounts, signal a relative inability to obtain funds
through market sources. But also the Federal Housing Loan Bank (FHLB) system
served as a signiﬁcant provider of liquidity for banks, during and before the crisis
(see Ashcraft et al. (2010)). FedFunds and FHLB together make up the bulk
of external ﬁnancing for small banks (see Figure 2.1). For a large number of
small institutions it is actually the only source of external ﬁnancing such that, for
the group of small institutions, a colinearity problem among the right hand side
variables arises. As a consequence, ExtF in is excluded as an explanatory variable
for this group.
Non-interest income has become an increasingly important source of revenue
for some banks. A higher revenue aside the traditional lending business can pro-
vide additional capacities for lending, and therefore it is a relevant balance sheet
characteristic for lending decisions.
A signiﬁcant part of the demand eﬀect on credit growth is likely to be com-
mon across banks and not dependent on individual-speciﬁc bank characteristics.
Therefore it should be picked up by the constant μ. The constant, however, is
relative to what can be explained by the BCs. Hence, it can be interpreted as
an ’excess demand’ eﬀect. According to Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010), unused
commitments are however one individual-speciﬁc characteristic which has driven
loan growth during the recent crisis. Existing credit lines or unused loan com-
mitments were used by creditors14 to bridge possible liquidity gaps, which partly
forced banks to supply credit in a situation where an expansion of their loan port-
folio was not optimal. To take account for this eﬀect as far as possible, I use the
change in unused loan commitments relative to total loans (UC) as an explanatory
variable. If commitments grow steadily with granted loans, then UC should be
close to zero. However, when the value of loans grows because commitments are
exploited, then this factor becomes highly negative and can pick up cross-sectional
variation in lending growth. On average, UC has indeed been lower during the
crisis, but there are large standard errors associated with these values. Relative
to total loans, large banks exhibit far higher rates of unused commitments, which
could reﬂect loan commitments to oﬀ-balance sheet vehicles.
2.2.3 Results - Cross Section
The taxonomy of bank balance sheet characteristics for aggregate lending is sum-
marized in tables 2.3 and 2.4. Overall, only a few BCs provide a signiﬁcant
quantitative contribution to aggregate lending dynamics. The BCs with the high-
est contributions among the small institutions are the core equity ratio Eq and
14Large banks in particular had to provide large amounts of back-stop liquidity for their oﬀ-
balance sheet vehicles. See Brunnermeier (2009).
45
Chapter 2 The Cross-Section of Bank Balance Sheets
Risk wt, whereas the external ﬁnancing ratio ExtF in, and also Eq, are responsi-
ble for most of the variation in large banks aggregate lending. Figure 2.2 visualizes
the total contributions and betas versus the aggregate lending dynamics within the
respective size groups over time.
A ﬁrst observation to be noted is the strong correlation between the estimated
betas and the total eﬀect of the BCs on aggregate lending. This eﬀectively means
that the variation of the total lending contributions is driven by varying lending
sensitivities, and not by the variation in the BCs. Hence, the decrease in the total
eﬀect of the core equity ratio starting in Q1 2009, does not mean that banking
sector core equity ratios have decreased, but it indicates a relaxation of the ob-
served lending sensitivity with respect to core equity ratios. Generally, for the
BCs15 the estimated total impacts on aggregate lending are almost entirely driven
by the changes in the respective lending sensitivities, as shown in tables 2.3 and
2.4, where var share beta and var shareBC are the ﬁrst order approximations of
the variance contributions of the beta and the banking sector levels to the to-
tal impact of the corresponding BC, respectively. This is a pertinent point, as
it implies that banks are actively forming their lending decisions on the basis of
their balance sheet strengths and are not just mechanically reacting to changes in
their BCs. Moreover, since the betas and the corresponding banking sector levels
move fairly independently of each other over time (the correlations are presented
in lines corr beta − BC), banks must be reacting to changes in other time-varying
exogenous factors, like macroeconomic activity or ﬁnancial market conditions.
2.2.3.1 Small Institutions
As depicted in Figure 2.2, the banking sector level of Eq was increasing until
Q2 2008, and then experienced a decline of 0.4 percentage points until Q1 2009.
Through this period, the bindingness of the equity constraint, as measured by the
lending sensitivity betaEq, remained high at a value of around 0.5, which translates
into a 0.5 percentage point higher lending growth for banks with a ceteris paribus
1% higher core equity ratio! The amount of core equity hence was crucial for small
banks lending decisions.
Risk wt has a constantly positive impact in the pre-crisis period (mean of 5.31%
p.Q.). However, it contributes strongly negatively to the dynamics of lending
growth. A high and positive Risk wt beta results in periods where banks with
already risky business models take on relatively more loans. This relationship is
15The only exceptions are the ratio of over-due loan to total loans (Due) and the relative change
in unused commitments (UC), which is just a control for changes in lending growth which are
independent of any balance sheet considerations. The lending sensitivities with respect to Due
are more stable than Due itself, which suggests that the ratio of over-due loans has a very direct
impact on lending decisions.
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Chapter 2 The Cross-Section of Bank Balance Sheets
even stronger at times when lending growth is weaker, and the eﬀect is strongly
positive until Q3 2008. In essence, additional risk taking by banks with already
high risk weights contributed to aggregate lending, especially in periods when more
conservative banks cut back their lending activities. The banking sector level of
Risk wt increased from just under 70% to more than 76%, equivalent to a shift
from absolutely save assets, like Treasuries, to risky loans, amounting to 6% of
total asset, which translates into a possible increase in lending of around $400bn!
Hence, for the group of small banks, the pre-crisis period can be characterized
as a period of additional risk-taking, both of banks with already risky balance
sheets and of solidly ﬁnanced institutions with high equity ratios.
With the outbreak of the crisis, this trend sharply reversed. Risk weights fell
by more than 4 percentage points and additional risk taking vanished. Starting
from Q3 2009, the equity restriction also became less binding, a year after the
outbreak and after the disruptive eﬀects of the crisis had abated.
Each eﬀect can explain almost the entire variation in crisis lending dynamics.
The reciprocal is picked up by the common eﬀect μ. Assuming that it captures
the ’excess demand’ eﬀect, Figure 2.3 suggests that the eﬀect was negative in the
two years leading up to the crisis and grew quickly to around 3% p.Q. by Q3 2009,
implying a change from excess supply to excess demand of loans. Other balance
sheet characteristics do not seem to drive a substantial part of aggregate lending
dynamics. The absolute impact of Liq is small (max 0.84% p.Q. pre-crisis and
max 0.39% p.Q. afterwards), even during the crisis. The extraordinary measures
of liquidity provision by the Fed appear to have been eﬀective in this respect,
as also FedFunds and FHLB do not pose a restriction to lending decisions in
the aggregate. UC, at least for the group of small institutions, neither plays a
noteworthy role nor exhibits a noticeable pattern. The two other risk proxies are
more relevant. Both NIM and Due exert a negative eﬀect on aggregate lending
of slightly above 1% pre-crisis and 1.5% afterwards, in line with the expectation
of a more limited credit supply capacity, when the asset portfolio is perceived as
relatively more risky; both ex-ante and ex-post. In the pre-crisis period, the total
eﬀect of the net interest margin could explain roughly 20% of the variation in
aggregate lending of small banks.
The majority of the smaller banks, in the sample between 55% and 62% (uni-
formly increasing over time), are state-chartered and thus their lending business
is constrained to the state they are registered in. As during the crisis, some states
have been hit harder by the crisis than others, imposing the same common de-
mand eﬀect across all states may be too restrictive. In particular, this may lead to
an overstating of the impacts of some bank characteristics on aggregate lending,
whereas these eﬀects are really due to diﬀerent state demand eﬀects. For that
matter, I introduce a full set of state-dummies into regression (2.1), instead of
50
Chapter 2 The Cross-Section of Bank Balance Sheets
Q3−01 Q3−02 Q3−03 Q3−04 Q3−05 Q3−06 Q3−07 Q3−08 Q3−09
−4.02
−2.39
−0.75
0.00
0.89
2.52
4.16
Le
nd
in
g 
G
ro
w
th
 in
 %
 p
.a
.
Const − Small Institutions
agg gL
tot cont Const
confint lo
confint hi
Q3−01 Q3−02 Q3−03 Q3−04 Q3−05 Q3−06 Q3−07 Q3−08 Q3−09
−0.71
−0.57
−0.42
−0.28
−0.13
0.00
0.01
be
ta
UC − Large Institutions
−2.85
−1.00
0.00
0.84
2.69
4.53
6.38
Le
nd
in
g 
G
ro
w
th
 in
 %
 p
.a
.
beta UC
agg gL
tot cont UC
confint lo
confint hi
Plotted are the estimated betas βj,t (red) and the total contribution βj,t
∑
i ωi,t−1BC (j)i,t−1
(blue) of the corresponding balance sheet characteristic to aggregate lending growth, together
with aggregate lending growth itself (black) over time. The estimated betas βj,t for the right
graph are measured on the left scale. The heteroskedasticity robust 95% conﬁdence intervals
(intervals are very small), indicated by the dotted lines, correspond to the total lending growth
contributions.
Figure 2.3: Contribution of Const (Small Institutions) and UC (Large Institu-
tions) to Within-Size Group Aggregate Lending
just one global constant μ. Table 2.8 in the Appendix, however, demonstrates
that state-speciﬁc demand eﬀects do not decisively alter the results. Slightly more
of the variation in aggregate lending is now picked up by the state dummies, as
compared to the single constant term μ, but the variance contributions of the BCs
are very similar. Only the negative contribution of Risk wt is even stronger in the
pre-crisis period now, whereas the post-crisis contribution is smaller, though still
large. Some part of what is reﬂected by the variation in Basel I risk weights is ob-
viously due to diﬀerences across states. Nevertheless, this does not aﬀect the more
general result that core equity ratios and Risk wt are the bank characteristics,
which are driving most of the variation in lending growth.
Unlike argued in Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004), the risk-weighted equity
ratio is by far less relevant than the actual core equity ratio. This conﬁrms the
view that risk weights are not very precise measures of the actual underlying risks
perceived by the banks themselves. Core equity, as a pure measure of the loss-
absorbing capacity of a bank, seems to be much more relevant for banks’ lending
decisions in the aggregate.
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2.2.3.2 Large Institutions and Robustness Issues
Turning to the large institutions, the total contribution of the BCs to large banks’
aggregate lending growth is generally more volatile, compared to the estimates for
the small institutions. On the one hand, this is due to the fact that lending growth
is more volatile as well, especially on a bank-individual basis. On the other hand,
the number of observation in this group is considerably smaller, namely around
360 per quarter, which gives individual banks a relatively larger weight in the
group-speciﬁc aggregate. Very high values of BCs of a few individual banks can
thus end up having an undesirably large eﬀect on the BC ′s total contribution to
aggregate lending. Figure 2.4 depicts the goodness of ﬁt of the aggregation method
in equation (2.2).
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The left graph depicts the goodness of ﬁt for small banks’ aggregate lending over time, whereas
the analog for the large institutions is presented in the right graph. gL agg obs denotes the
observed aggregate lending in the stratiﬁed sample as deﬁned in section 2.2.1. The estimated
series stems from the estimated cross-sectional model (2.2), leaving aside the aggregate error
term
∑
i ωi,t−1εi,t. The conservative series is based on the result using the robust aggregation
method, which is described in the Appendix.
Figure 2.4: Goodness of Fit
The diﬀerence between the observed series and the estimate is the aggregate
error term
∑
i ωi,t−1εi,t. The dashed lines represent the conservative estimates, as
explained in the Appendix. The conservative estimate only uses observations with
observed balance sheet characteristics within a certain range for the aggregation
procedure, to avoid a potentially distortionary eﬀect of a few very large BC values.
Indeed, this estimate provides a slightly better ﬁt than the full sample estimate
for the large banks.
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The aggregate goodness of ﬁt for the group of small institutions is already very
high with the standard aggregation method (R2 = 99.3%)16, which suggests that
the careful handling of the data, as described in section 2.2.1, eﬃciently takes care
of extreme outliers and consequently the individual errors are uncorrelated with
the share in aggregate lending, and hence with the size of the institutions. The
results for the small institutions virtually do not change with the more conservative
aggregation method.
As the aggregate ﬁt is not perfect (R2 = 85.3%) and the exclusion of very high
BC values changes the dynamics of estimated aggregate lending of large banks17,
I will henceforth concentrate on the conservative results for this size-group as
presented in Table 2.4, which generally decrease the absolute contribution of the
balance sheet characteristics to observed aggregate lending18 and therefore can be
seen as a lower absolute bound. The general results however do not depend on
whether the plain or the conservative aggregation method is employed.
Another valid critique concerns the feedback eﬀect of individual large banks on
the macroeconomic environment, which in turn could aﬀect the estimated lending
sensitivities19. While this case cannot be disproved, as a ’clean’, feedback-free,
measure of lending growth is not obtainable, the natural channels through which
feedback eﬀects may work do not change the general results here. The adequate
robustness checks are performed in section 2.3.2.
ExtF in contributes around 65% to the variation in large banks’ aggregate
lending growth and is the single characteristic with the highest contribution. Two
distinctive points, the spike in Q3 2007 and the spike in Q3 2008, stick out (Figure
2.2). Both are periods of distress and institutions with high ratios of external
ﬁnance apparently could or had to provide noticeably more funds, compared to
institutions with a higher degree of equity and deposit funding. These spikes
occur in periods when large institutions were forced to provide backstop liquidity
to oﬀ-balance sheet vehicles (Brunnermeier (2009)). Part of the eﬀect shows up
in UC as the spike in the corresponding lending sensitivity (Figure 2.3), but the
16In addition, the estimated contributions to aggregate lending change only marginally with
the conservative estimate, which suggests that the sample of small institutions is robust to very
high values of the BCs. The corresponding results are reported in the Appendix.
17The conservative estimate does not decrease the aggregate goodness of ﬁt at all. The R2 of
86.8% is even slightly higher than the R2 obtained from the full sample.
18The estimates over the full sample, provided in the Appendix, are quantitatively very similar.
Assigning a lower absolute contribution for each of the BCs, can however eliminate the aggrega-
tion error which arises, since some individual banks have a non-marginal inﬂuence on aggregate
lending growth. Therefore the conservative estimates most likely provide a more precise picture
of the variance contributions.
19Clearly, this problem does not exist among the small banks. The largest bank in the sample
has a maximum share of 17.85% in outstanding loans of US bank loans in the sample period,
whereas the maximum share of any small institution is less than 0.1% at any point in time.
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quantitatively larger part is captured by ExtF in. Institutions, which were taking
great amounts of assets from their special purpose vehicles back onto their balance
sheets, were apparently also institutions with high degrees of external ﬁnance.
This is consistent with the appearance of the two spikes and it also explains the
strong negative eﬀects in the following periods, Q4 2007 and Q4 2008, when exactly
those institutions had to freeze their credit supply. The reason why this eﬀect is
not picked up by the change in unused commitments (UC contributes at max 1%
p.Q.) is that in the sample period, liquidity backstop guarantees to oﬀ-balance
sheet vehicles were not reported as unused commitments and hence UC can, by
construction, only represent the eﬀect of a change in unused commitments tied to
actual loans appearing on the balance sheet. In the present setup, the eﬀect is
driven by the possibility to raise external ﬁnance, or in this incident, the potential
downside risk of taking on too much external debt, which has materialized. Note
that, since the absolute contribution of ExtF in to aggregate lending is mostly
negative in the pre-crisis period, banks with lower external ﬁnance ratios supplied
more loans. Additional loans must have been ﬁnanced by new external debt,
however, since banking sector levels of ExtF in were rising substantially.
Similar to the small institutions, where the additional loans were supplied by
banks with relatively higher equity ratios, more conservatively funded large in-
stitutions were also supplying additional loans. The diﬀerence i,s however, that
the potential for supplying more credit is generated by the availability of exter-
nal ﬁnance and not by relatively larger equity buﬀers. Again, this trend started
to reverse sharply during the crisis, leading to a rapid decline in banking sector
external ﬁnancing ratios, and at the same time to a decline in aggregate lending.
Eq itself also explains a signiﬁcant part of the pre-crisis lending growth dynam-
ics. Nevertheless, the equity restriction was almost never binding, as the average
absolute contribution is slightly negative (−1.2% p.Q.). Large banks were appar-
ently managing their core equity well and, in times when the restriction became
more binding, lending growth was reduced which generates a negative variance
contribution to aggregate lending growth.
Both sources of funding of last resort, FedFund and FHLB, as expected,
contribute negatively to the dynamics of lending growth. Institutions which re-
quire more of these types of funding are not able to do so via the interbank or
capital markets, which signals distress. The more this is necessary in the aggre-
gate to maintain credit supply, the more severe the stress is in the banking sector,
and hence the negative correlation with aggregate lending growth. Consequently,
FedFund and FHLB can explain a notable amount of the variation in aggregate
lending.
To some extent this also holds true for the risk proxies. Whereas almost no
explanatory power adheres to Risk wt, both the net interest margin NIM and the
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share of overdue loan in total loans Due bear some relevance to aggregate lending
dynamics. The average absolute impact of Due is at around −2% p.Q. during
the crisis, compared to −1% before. The increased share of over-due loans thus
shifts down the average lending growth per quarter by 1 percentage point. This
eﬀect does not vary a lot over time and, therefore, the variance contribution is
quite small. This is not the case for NIM . Before the crisis, banks with a higher
NIM supplied relatively more credit, increasing lending growth in the aggregate.
This additional risk taking was reversed after Q3 2008, as banks with a lower
net interest margin lended more (absolute negative eﬀect), in cycle with lending
growth.
2.3 Macroeconomic Determinants of Aggregate Lend-
ing Dynamics
Ultimately, banks will decide upon the project they would like to ﬁnance after tak-
ing into account the economic environment. At times when the economic outlook
is strong and a persistent growth in economic activity is expected, it is optimal
to supply more credit, compared to recessions, or times of high uncertainty. Both
demand and expected default rates are aﬀected by changes in the economic envi-
ronment and, hence, the individual-speciﬁc balance sheet constraints will be more
or less binding as well. It would for example be optimal to hold a higher share
of loans to total assets and to have a lower equity ratio during upturns, whereas,
in downturns, a higher equity buﬀer and a relatively lower weight for loans in the
asset portfolio is more desirable. In turn, the lending sensitivity with respect to
Eq should ceteris paribus be lower and the β associated with Risk wt should ce-
teris paribus be higher under favorable economic conditions compared to periods
of economic distress.
The aim of this section is to analyze how far lending sensitivities, and conse-
quently aggregate lending dynamics, are driven by macroeconomic and ﬁnancial
factors. For this purpose, I use four groups of macroeconomic factors, which should
comprise the decisive pieces of information on which the banks under consideration
were basing their lending decisions before and during the crisis. For each group,
the ﬁrst principal component of the member variables20 is calculated to serve as the
proxy for the corresponding factor. The four macro-factors and the corresponding
variables are
20The principal components are calculated on the basis of standardized (mean zero and unit
variance) variables. Delinq is multiplied by -1 in order to get a consistent group, in which vari-
ables do not move into opposite directions when hit by the same macro shocks. With increased
economic activity, economy wide delinquencies rates are typically decreasing.
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1. Economic Activity: GDP , I, Delinq
2. Interest Rates / Reﬁnancing Costs: FF rate
3. Expected Economic Conditions: MIC Conf , ISM , ΔBUS 1y, BUS 5y
4. Financial Market Risk: AB Spread, TEDSpread, V IX, S&P V ol
for which deﬁnitions and details are provided in Table 2.5. The ﬁrst two macro-
factors are widely used in the literature, whereas economy-wide delinquency rates
are considered in addition, as they are a potentially relevant factor for banks’ as-
sessment of current macroeconomic conditions. Since lending decisions are mostly
longer-term commitments, not only current, but also expected, economic conditions
matter for deriving the optimal credit supply. Here, I use several survey measures,
assuming they reﬂect the common expectation regarding the future state of the
economy. Finally, a factor for ﬁnancial market risk is considered, to mirror reﬁ-
nancing conditions. If the perceived risk and the price of risk on ﬁnancial markets
are low, banks can more easily obtain funding at a low cost from the capital market,
which can extend, in particular, large banks’ capacity to supply credit.
As shown in the previous section, almost all of the variation in aggregate lend-
ing is due to adjustments in the lending sensitivities21. Recall that the β’s are
estimated in an unrestricted way, in the sense that they are allowed to vary freely
over time. These two features make apparent the virtue of the Kashyap and Stein
(2000) approach. If changes in the economic environment inﬂuence lending deci-
sions, then the induced variation in the estimated betas is the channel through
which lending is aﬀected in the aggregate. The unrestricted estimation does not
preimpose any comovement with the common factors above and it captures the
dynamics of aggregate lending very closely. Hence, it allows to analyze how much
of the variation in lending sensitivities can be explained by comovements with
common macro factors and therefore more generally, whether a major part of the
credit expansion before the crisis and the credit contraction during the crisis can
be attributed to the changes in the macroeconomic environment, or, whether the
lending dynamics are not driven by fundamentals at all.
21With the exception ofDue and UC, as shown above. Those two factors are excluded from the
time-series analysis (2.4) but are again taken into account for the panel model, as the coeﬃcient
estimates on the interaction terms reﬂect both the variation in lending sensitivities and the BCs.
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Underlying
Macro-Factor Variables Variable Description
GDP, I Growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Investment (I).
Economic Seasonally adjusted data, from the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds.
Activity Delinquency Rates on Loans and Leases on total loans as calculated
(MacroAct) by the Federal Reserve and published on their website.
Delinq Delinq enters negatively into the factor MacroAct.
Delinquent loans and leases are those past due thirty days or more
and still accruing interest as well as those in non accrual status.
Interest Rates FF rate Quarterly average Fed Funds rate in % p.a. as published
(IntRates) on the Federal Reserve Board website.
MIC Conf Consumer Conﬁdence Index from
Thomson Reuters/University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers.
Expected ISM Purchasing Managers Index from the Institute of Supply Managers.
Economic Obtained from Datastream.
Conditions ΔBUS 1y Index for expected change in business conditions in a year.
(MacroExp) From Thomson Reuters/University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers.
BUS 5y Index for business conditions expected during the next ﬁve years.
From Thomson Reuters/University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers.
AB Spread Index of spread between Aaa and Baa rated bonds in % p.a..
Data from Federal Reserve website.
Spread between the 3-month Libor rate and the 3-month T-bill rate
Financial TEDSpread in % p.a.. Libor rate is the quarterly average of the London Interbanking
Market rate for 3-month loans in USD. The Libor rate.is from Wall Street
Risk Journal, the 3-month T-Bill rate from the Federal Reserve Board website.
(FinRisk) V IX Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index. Measure of
implied volatility of S&P 500 index options. Obtained from Datastream.
S&P V ol Ex-post volatility of the S&P 500 index. Calculated as the within quarter
variance of returns on the S&P 500 index. Obtained from Datastream.
The Macro-Factor is the ﬁrst principal component of the Underlying Variables as described
above.
Table 2.5: Description of Macro and Financial Market Variables
The structural model for describing the beta dynamics is:
βj,t = φj,0 + φj,1M1,t−1 + φj,2M2,.t + φj,3M3,t−1 + φj,4M4,.t + uj,t (2.4)
where Mk denotes the k-th macro-factor as deﬁned above. The constant φj,0
is added, as the ﬁrst principal components have a zero mean. Banks are assumed
to make their credit supply decisions on the basis of the information which is
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available up to time t. The macro-factors 1 and 3 are lagged by one period22
to take account for the fact that the information on macroeconomic data and
surveys is not available in real time, but is usually published later. The principal
components for interest rates and ﬁnancial market risk are calculated on the basis
of quarterly averages of the underlying daily observations. This data is readily
available in real time and thus M2 and M4 enter as contemporaneous values in
regression (2.4). Table 2.6 presents the results. The estimates var cont beta provide
the variance contribution of the macro factor to the lending sensitivities from
equation (2.4), measured in percent. Analogous to the variance contribution of
lending sensitivities to aggregate lending in equation (2.3), they are calculated as
var cont beta (j,m) =
cov
(
βj,t, φj,mMm,t(−1)∗
)
var (βj,t)
(2.5)
where Mm,t(−1)∗stands for Mm,t for m = 1, 2 and Mm,t−1 for m = 2, 4.
2.3.1 Small Institutions
Whereas a major part of the variation in those betas, which are most relevant
for small banks’ aggregate lending, can be explained by the macro and ﬁnancial
factors, the comovement between the large institutions’ lending sensitivities and
the common factors is not very pronounced. Figure 2.5 visualized how much of
the variation in the unrestricted Eq beta of small institutions and the unrestricted
ExtF in beta of large banks can be explained by the 4 macro-factors together.
The most signiﬁcant part of small banks’ aggregate lending is obviously driven
by changes in expected macroeconomic conditions. This factor is able to explain
about half of the variation in the Eq lending sensitivity and 50% of the changes in
the Risk wt beta. In line with previous ﬁndings in the literature, equity is more of
a restriction, when expectations about future economic conditions are deteriorat-
ing. Notably, expected economic conditions matter rather than the current state of
the economy, as the impact of the MacroAct factor is insigniﬁcant and small. As
Figure 2.6 shows, expected economic conditions were already trending downwards
long before the crisis, with a short but strong rebound in the beginning of 2007.
Even after the rebound, banks with a stronger core equity ratio were still con-
tributing positively to lending growth and hence taking on additional risks. With
the arrival of the crisis, the economic outlook deteriorated sharply, and the equity
restriction became crucial until expectations started improving again. Consistent
with the risk-taking story from the previous section, Risk wt comoves positively
with MacroExp. As the economic outlook improves, the impact of risk-taking
strengthens until Q3 2008, when both trends reverse. Overall, a signiﬁcant part of
22Running the regression on contemporaneous values of M has no notable eﬀect on the results.
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Plotted are the unrestricted beta estimates βj,t from equation (1) and the structural estimates∑
m
∑
j φj,mMm,t−1 from equation (2) for the corresponding balance sheet characteristic j. This
is to show, how much of the time-variation in the lending sensitivities βj,t can be captured by
the four macro-factors M1...M4.
Figure 2.5: Explanatory Power of the Macro Factors for the Unrestricted Eq (Small
Institutions) and ExtF in (Large Institutions) Lending Sensitivities.
the dynamics in both Eq and Risk wt is rationalized by changes in expectations
about macroeconomic conditions.
In line with previous ﬁndings in the literature (Kashyap and Stein (2000), Kis-
han and Opiela (2000)), the Liq and Eq restrictions are more binding when interest
rates rise; and this eﬀect is smaller for larger banks. However, the quantitatively
largest impact of interest rate changes on lending growth dynamics works through
the common factor μ, of which’s time-variation it explains close to 50%. When
interest rates are lowered, the component unrelated to bank-individual character-
istics μ increases. If μ is interpreted as excess demand, the implication from this
setup is that the quantitatively relevant eﬀect of interest rate changes is rather a
demand eﬀect, than a lending channel eﬀect.
With respect to the small institutions, FinRisk and MacroAct do not have
notable explanatory power for lending sensitivities and consequently for small bank
aggregate lending.
2.3.2 Large Institutions and Robustness Issues
Large banks’ lending sensitivities, on the other hand, do not seem to be strongly
driven by the fundamental factors. FinRisk loads signiﬁcantly on μ and Risk wt,
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but can account only for 8% and 13% of their respective time-variation. A similar
picture emerges for interest rates. In particular, the lending sensitivities with
respect to ExtF in show no signiﬁcant relationship with any of the macro and
ﬁnancial factors.
Possible ﬂaws in the time-series estimation could be due to seasonality eﬀects
or exceptional exogenously induced spikes in both the betas and the exogenous
factors. As a large part of lending is attributed to real estate loans, which are
highly seasonal, this eﬀect may have been transferred to the respective betas,
which would bias the estimated φ coeﬃcients.
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The plots show the unrestricted beta estimates βj,t from equation (1) versus selected Macro-
Factors for the class of small banks.
Figure 2.6: Macro-Factors versus Unrestricted Betas
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In addition, some time-particular eﬀects like the Hedge-Fund crisis in Q3 2007
or the collapse of Lehman in Q3 2008 may generate spurious φ estimates. As
a robustness-check, regression (2.4) is run with appropriately ﬁltered data23. As
Table 2.9 in the Appendix conﬁrms, the results for either size group hardly change.
On average, the explanatory power of the macro and ﬁnancial market proxies
strengthens, however, changes are minor and in no instance qualitatively alter the
results.
A second issue, raised in Kashyap and Stein (2000), is the extensive parametriza-
tion in the two-step estimation procedure. They suggest a panel data setup, which
can be derived by using the parametrization of equation (2.4) for the betas to be
estimated in the repeated cross-sectional regression (2.1). This restricted setup
now allows the coeﬃcients γ to vary only in accordance with the macro factors M ,
which are interacted with the bank characteristics BC:
gLi,t = k +
∑
m
γmMm,t−1 +
∑
j
γj,0BC (j)i,t−1 (2.6)
+
∑
m
∑
j
γj,mBC (j)i,t−1Mm,t(−1)∗ + εi,t
The panel setup allows the number of parameters for each size group to be reduced
to less than one seventh of the parameters in the unrestricted repeated cross-section
setup. This comes at the cost of a less ﬂexible model, as less of the time series
variation in lending sensitivities can be covered. On the upside, in particular for
the group of large banks, which does not provide such an abundant number of
observations, the γ estimates from the panel setup yield statistically more precise
estimates than the φ coeﬃcients from the two step procedure. If a signiﬁcant
part of the variation in lending sensitivities can be reproduced by the four M
factors, then the estimates should be quite similar. Table 2.7 summarizes the
results of the pooled OLS regression (2.6). Reassuringly, the estimates do not
diﬀer decisively. The explanatory power of MacroExp for the Eq and Risk wt
betas for the group of small banks is slightly lower, but this is picked by the
factor capturing current macroeconomic conditions, MacroAct. Also, interest
rates remain the main driver of the constant term μ. Mostly, with the γ estimates
from the panel regression, even more of the variation in the original unrestricted
betas is replicated, compared to using the φ estimates in regression (2.4), which is
reﬂected in the higher corresponding R2s.
The estimates for the large institutions, as expected, deviate slightly more
from the values obtained from the two step procedure. Nevertheless, the general
results remain unchanged. ExtF in still does not comove signiﬁcantly with any of
23The employed ﬁlter is a symmetric band-pass ﬁlter, with oscillation of the ﬁltered components
between 2 and 4 quarters. A description can be found in Christiano and Fitzgerald (1999).
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the M factors. MacroAct can explain around 10% of the variation now, but the
coeﬃcient estimate is not statistically diﬀerent from zero, even at a 90% signiﬁ-
cance level. Interest rates seem to have a slightly higher impact on several lending
sensitivities, but in no occasion exhibit a noteworthy explanatory power.
As mentioned above, another possible bias in measuring the comovement of
macro and ﬁnancial factors with the estimated β’s could stem from the non-trivial
size of some large institutions. During the crisis, a feedback eﬀect from the actions
of the biggest lenders in the US to the state of the macroeconomy and the ﬁnancial
markets is likely to have been at work. Whereas this cannot be ruled out, a check
whether a crisis feedback eﬀect is strongly inﬂuencing the above results for the large
banks is feasible. For this purpose, I re-estimate the panel model with observations
until Q3 2008 only. If the estimates are similar to the ones for the whole sample,
the feedback eﬀect most likely did not alter the results in a pivotal way. At the
same time, this approach can reveal sample stability issues, caused by potential
structural breaks in the comovement between lending sensitivities and the state of
the macroeconomy. One decisive diﬀerence for the large banks becomes apparent.
ExtF in is now driven to a greater extent by the macro and ﬁnancial factors. Using
the pre-crisis sample and the panel setup, more than half of the variation in the
original cross-sectional ExtF in beta in the pre-crisis time span can be replicated
with the four M factors. As all the other estimates are very similar, this diﬀerence
is most likely attributable to a structural break. Indeed, when the panel data
model is estimated on the crisis period (Q3 2008 - Q2 2010) only, the loadings
on IntRates, MacroExp and FinRisk change signs. The γ on the interaction
term of MacroAct and ExtF in however remains similar, which accounts for the
explanatory power of the pre-crisis sample estimates. As noted in the previous
section, in both periods the availability of external ﬁnance was aﬀecting aggregate
lending dynamics of large banks in the same way. As however the values of the M
factors clearly change with the crisis, the correlation ﬂipped as well. The structural
break can in principle have been caused by feedback eﬀects, but there is no a priori
reason why this should have aﬀected exclusively the ExtF in lending sensitivities
in a signiﬁcant way.
The estimates for the small institutions do not seem to suﬀer from sample sta-
bility issues as Table 2.10 in the Appendix conﬁrms. Clearly, the original dynamics
of the constant term cannot be mirrored, but this is well-expected, since in the
panel setup the unrestricted time-ﬁxed eﬀects, which capture a lot of the variation
in aggregate lending, are substituted by the plain M factors, which naturally can-
not absorb an equally high amount of the common eﬀect. Nonetheless, the main
results pointed out above persist. Even though the additional variation caused
by the crisis can be expected to emphasize the comovement of lending sensitivi-
ties with the state of the macroeconomy, the estimates from the pre-crisis sample
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can still replicate the major part of the time-series dynamics of the full-sample
unrestricted betas.
2.4 Conclusions
The central point of this paper is the question of what drives US aggregate bank
lending in the period between Q1 2001 and Q2 2010.
Individual banks’ lending decisions are made on the basis of their balance sheet
characteristics, taking into account current and expected economic conditions.
How sensitive lending decisions are with respect to banks’ balance sheet charac-
teristics (BCs) in the cross section, at a given point in time, therefore signals
how relevant the respective balance sheet characteristic is for aggregate lending.
With a consistent aggregation procedure, I derive a taxonomy of bank balance
sheet characteristics, meaning a classiﬁcation of the importance of a wide variety
of BCs for the time-variation in aggregate lending.
Small banks’ aggregate lending is mainly driven by three characteristics: core
equity (Eq), the riskiness of its business model measured by the Basel I risk weight
(Risk wt) and a common component μ, which can be interpreted as a excess de-
mand eﬀect. A solid core equity ratio proved crucial for strong lending growth,
both before and during the crisis. The high impact of relatively riskier small
banks on lending growth before Q3 2008 suggests a certain momentum in risk
taking. Both eﬀects can however, to a signiﬁcant extent, be explained by im-
proving expectations regarding future macroeconomic conditions. Interest rates
have statistically signiﬁcant loadings on the lending sensitivities with respect to
equity and liquidity ratios, as documented in the lending channel literature. The
quantitatively largest eﬀect, however, works through the common component. A
1 percentage point lower interest rate shift small banks’ aggregate lending growth
upward by more than 1.5 percentage points. The interest rate eﬀects through Eq
and Liq, on the other hand, are negligible.
Large institutions’ aggregate lending also shows a signiﬁcant dependence on
core equity. The characteristic with the highest measured impact, however, is the
external ﬁnancing ratio (ExtF in), which also proxies how well an institution can
obtain funding from the capital markets. Similar to the small institutions, where
the additional loans were supplied by banks with relatively higher equity ratios,
more conservatively funded large institutions were also supplying additional loans.
The diﬀerence is, that the capacity for supplying more credit is generated by the
availability of external ﬁnance and not by relatively larger equity buﬀers. With the
outbreak of the crisis, this eﬀect reversed, together with a general decline in exter-
nal ﬁnancing ratios. Generally, the lending decisions of large banks do not seem
to be driven by changes in macroeconomic factors, such as current macroeconomic
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activity, interest rates, expectations of future economic conditions, or ﬁnancial
market risk. This result may be spurious due to possible feedback eﬀects from the
actions of large ﬁnancial institutions to the macroeconomy and ﬁnancial markets.
A more robust estimate, using only observations until Q2 2008, suggests that 50%
of the pre-crisis impact of ExtF in on large banks’ aggregate lending could be
explained by the four macro-factors, in particular by macroeconomic activity.
Overall, the ﬁndings of this paper suggest that a notable part of the strong
lending dynamics prior to Q3 2008 was propagated by previously more conservative
institutions, which were willing to take on more risks. This additional risk-taking
can, to a signiﬁcant extent, be rationalized by a favorable economic environment.
Furthermore, the very limited bindingness of liquidity constraints on the asset side,
for both large and small banks, suggests, that the extraordinary actions by the
Federal Reserve to ensure a suﬃcient supply of liquidity have been eﬀective.
All of the results above lend themselves to expedient implications for ﬁnancial
regulation. With bullish expectations about future economic conditions, small
banks take on additional risks, especially institutions with high equity buﬀers
and already relatively more risky business models. In this light, the recently
proposed Basel III regulations, which have a stronger focus on core equity as a
capital restriction and also envisage counter-cyclical capital buﬀers, seem capable
to smooth lending dynamics over the business cycle and limit the momentum in
risk-taking of small banks.
As for the large banks, a stabilizing eﬀect could be achieved by curbing excessive
funding through capital markets, especially in strong economic conditions. The
degree of capital market ﬁnancing seems at least a sensible characteristic to monitor
by ﬁnancial regulators, in order to detect a potentially destabilizing reliance on
liquidity provision from capital markets.
As this paper conﬁnes itself to the analysis of bank lending, the impact of poten-
tial substitution eﬀects from other forms of ﬁnance is not captured. In particular,
against the background of the general tendency of large ﬁrms to raise funding from
capital markets, the substitution eﬀect for large institutions could be sizable and
a more comprehensive analysis would be beneﬁcial in this respect. A similar cri-
tique concerns the so called ’shadow-banking’ sector. If a sizable share of lending
activity is moved to bank-like organizations, banks may react accordingly and be
ready to take on more risks to defend their businesses. Equivalently, increased
competition in the lending sector in general may have induced a more aggressive
risk-taking behavior (Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008)). An interesting extension of the
analysis would therefore be to quantify the impact of increased competition on
risk-taking, and ultimately aggregate lending, in conjunction with fundamental
macroeconomic factors.
Another issue for further research is related to the risk management behavior
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of a bank. Some of the results here are consistent with a simple risk target story
as in Adrian and Shin (2010). If a bank has a value-at-risk target, for example,
improving conditions will decreased the perceived risks and free capacities for
additional risks and thus lending. With bank-individual data on value-at-risk and
other pivotal risk management statistics, this eﬀect could be quantiﬁed.
Appendix
Data
The underlying quarterly data from the US call reports is obtained from the FDIC
website24. The analysis in this paper conﬁnes itself to the time period of Q1 2001
to Q2 2010. It comprises FDIC insured institutions in the US, which includes
commercial banks, savings banks and savings institutions, and subsidiaries of for-
eign institutions, which are registered with the FDIC. It does not, however, cover
Branches and Agencies of Foreign Bank Oﬃces (FBO’s), which are signiﬁcant sup-
pliers of credit in the US. In the last decade they were responsible for up to 8,6%
of total bank lending and up to 21.1% of C&I loans of all commercial banks in
the last decade. At the peak in 2007, they held 15.6% of total assets. Foreign
branches and agencies are mostly not FDIC insured, so they are not included in
the dataset here. In particular, for the analysis of small business loans this poses a
problem, as the actual lending ﬁgures might diﬀer signiﬁcantly when FBO’s are in-
cluded. Foreign banks’ branches and agencies do ﬁle a so called FFIEC 002 form25,
which however does not cover most of the items analyzed here. For the analysis in
this Chapter, a restriction to only FDIC insured institutions is unavoidable, given
the data limitations. Still, it also seems sensible from a logical standpoint, given
the very limited autonomy, and therefore autonomy in bank lending decisions, for
foreign branches and agencies.
Banks which are engaged in mergers or acquisitions are removed at the quarter
in which the merger takes eﬀect, and also the previous quarter. To avoid a double
counting eﬀect, all institutions which are directly owned by another institution in
the sample are dropped. In quarters when institutions enter or leave the sample,
they are also excluded. Further, US subsidiaries in foreign US aﬃliated states are
not considered. Starting with roughly 282,000 observations, this decimates the
dataset by 7,600 observations. Excluding all banks with total assets of less than
25 million USD, as those cannot be regarded as viable credit-supplying ﬁnancial
institutions (Berger and Bouwmann (2009)), cuts the sample by a further 22,400
data points. Some institutions in the sample are acting rather as mutual funds for
24http://www2.fdic.gov/sdi/index.asp
25See http://www.ﬃec.gov/forms002.htm for all the series covered.
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Treasury Bills than credit providing institutions and exhibit lending ratios below
10%, liquidity ratios of beyond 90% and risk-adjusted capital ratios of 100% and
more. Naturally these observations cannot provide signiﬁcant information towards
cross-sectional determinants of bank lending. Consequently, this group, entailing
roughly 19,400 additional observations, is dropped from the sample as well. To
prevent that any extreme lending growth decisions, which are most likely driven
by other bank speciﬁc exogenous circumstances, aﬀect the estimates, observations
with above 50% and below -50% net lending growth per quarter26, as well as
observations exhibiting above 100% and below -50% total asset growth in one
quarter are wiped out, which reduces the dataset by another 1,000 observations.
Securitization activities have to be reported only by banks with total assets greater
than $200m. For non-reporting banks, the value of securitized loans is simply set
to zero, which most probably comes very close the real value, but in any case will
not alter the results in a measurable way. As a last step, extreme outliers and
implausible data points are removed. Implausible observations are constituted
by institutions with negative equity, negative total assets, negative risk weighted
assets, negative risk weights or risk weights larger than 100%, negative net interest
margins, negative Fed Funds and FHLB values, and institutions with higher core
equity than total risk weighted (T ier2) capital ratios. Outliers are deﬁned as
observations which are more than 4 standard deviations away from their mean
at a given quarter, and this is applied to both net lending growth and all right
hand side balance sheet factors in the analysis. At the end, this leaves close to
266,000 observations in the sample, which is equivalent to an average of about
7,400 observation per quarter. The number of institutions at a given quarter is
however steadily declining over time. In Q1 2001 there are about 7,900 usable
observation, which reduces to slightly above 7,000 in Q2 2010.
Conservative Aggregation Method
The conservative aggregation method works methodically as described in equation
(2.2). To avoid a potentially distortionary eﬀect from extreme BC values, some
observations are not considered for the aggregation and the weights ωi are recalcu-
lated based on the reduced sample. In particular, the following values are deemed
extreme and are therefore excluded from the aggregation:
Eq > 25% ExcT ier2 > 30% Risk wt > 95% NIM > 5% Due > 4%
Liq > 50% Liq > 50% ExtF in > 33% SecAct > 10% FedFunds > 10%
FHLB > 10% NI Inc < −10% NI Inc > 10% UC < −10% UC > 10%
26See Table (2.1) on how net lending growth is measured exactly.
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Approximated Variance Contributions
The variance contributions of the two components βj,t and
∑
i ωi,t−1BC (j)i,t−1
to the total impact on aggregate lending of factor j, which according to equation
(2.2) is βj,t
∑
i ωi,t−1BC (j)i,t−1, is approximated as below. A ﬁrst-order Taylor ap-
proximation around the time series mean of the total impact on aggregate lending
yields
βj,t
∑
i
ωi,t−1BC (j)i,t−1 ≈ βj,t
∑
i
ωi,t−1BC (j)i,t−1
+βj,t
⎛
⎝∑
i
ωi,t−1BC (j)i,t−1 −
∑
i(s)
ωi,t−1BC (j)i,t−1
⎞
⎠
+
∑
i(s)
ωi,t−1BC (j)i,t−1
(
βj,t − βj,t
)
where the upper bar denotes the time series mean.
Then, the variance of βj,t
∑
i ωi,t−1BC (j)i,t−1 can be decomposed as
var
(
βj,t
∑
i
ωi,t−1BC (j)i,t−1
)
= cov
(
βj,t
∑
i
ωi,t−1BC (j)i,t−1 , βj,t
∑
i
ωi,t−1BC (j)i,t−1
)
≈ cov
(
βj,t
∑
i
ωi,t−1BC (j)i,t−1 , βj,t
∑
i
ωi,t−1BC (j)i,t−1
)
+cov
(
βj,t
∑
i
ωi,t−1BC (j)i,t−1 ,
∑
i
ωi,t−1BC (j)i,t−1βj,t
)
The variance shares for factor j and beta j are deﬁned as
var share beta (j) ≡
cov
(
βj,t
∑
i ωi,t−1BC (j)i(s),t−1 , βj,t
∑
i ωi,t−1BC (j)i,t−1
)
var
(
βj,t
∑
i ωi,t−1BC (j)i,t−1
)
var share factor (j) ≡
cov
(
βj,t
∑
i ωi,t−1BC (j)i,t−1 ,
∑
i ωi,t−1BC (j)i,t−1βj,t
)
var
(
βj,t
∑
i ωi,t−1BC (j)i,t−1
)
such that
var share beta (j) + var share factor (j) ≈ 1
where the approximate equality stems from the ﬁrst-order approximation above.
For all estimated total impacts the ﬁrst order approximation is suﬃciently
precise and yields an R2 higher than 0.99.
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Chapter 3
The Real Eﬀects of Liquidity and
Financial Market Conditions
A Threshold VAR Approach
3.1 Introduction
Adverse conditions on the ﬁnancial market are considered to be one of the main
propagators of the ﬁnancial crisis in 2007-20091 and real eﬀects of ﬁnancial market
conditions are documented widely in the literature. A seminal paper is Bernanke
(1983), who argues that adverse ﬁnancial market conditions lead to higher costs of
credit intermediation. More recently, a number of papers have focused on liquidity
eﬀects and pro-cyclical behavior of ﬁnancial intermediaries. Brunnermeier and
Pedersen (2009) highlight the link between market liquidity, the ease at which
assets are traded, and funding liquidity, the ease at which the necessary funding
can be obtained. In their model, funding and market liquidity mutually reinforce
each other, leading to downward spirals when bad shocks occur. As a result,
liquidity has an eﬀect on asset price volatility. Adrian and Shin (2010) argue that
banks’ balance sheets provide information about funding liquidity. In a marking to
market environment, US investment banks managed their balance sheets according
to Value-at-Risk (VaR), increasing leverage when the VaR goes down. A growth in
leverage indicates increased funding liquidity in the ﬁnancial sector, as the demand
for assets increases. They conﬁrm the implications of Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2009), as they ﬁnd that leverage growth can predict future market volatility. He
and Krishnamurty (2008) develop a model where intermediary capital aﬀects the
risk bearing capacity of the marginal investor.
As a common feature and testable implication arises that both liquidity eﬀects
1see Brunnermeier (2009) for a summary on the ﬁnancial crises
73
Chapter 3 The Real Eﬀects of Liquidity and Financial Market Conditions
and changes in uncertainty should have an eﬀect on economic activity; either
directly, or indirectly through the capacity and willingness to supply credit to
the real economy. Furthermore, the feature that liquidity eﬀects are potentially
self-enforcing and pro-cyclical suggests a transmission mechanism which diﬀers
depending on whether favorable or adverse shocks occur, and whether those shocks
are large enough to induce the self-enforcing feedback spirals or not.
The aim of this paper is to quantify the real eﬀects of liquidity spirals, ﬁnancial
market risk and credit supply, taking into account the fundamentally diﬀerent
behavior of “good” versus “bad”2 cycles.
The idea, that there are diﬀerent regimes and agents behave fundamentally
diﬀerent in “good” conditions compared to “bad” conditions, is also a common
feature across many credit market models, as for example in Blinder (1987) or
Azariadis and Smith (1998). Further, the propagation of shocks can diﬀer hugely,
like in von Hagen and Zhang (2008). Empirically, the identiﬁcation of diﬀerent
regimes and non-linearities in shock transmissions have been studied in conjunction
with monetary policy by Sims and Zha (2006), and many others, on the basis
of Markov Switching Models, in which transition probabilities, and thus regime
switches, are not endogenously determined however.
This paper adopts a regime switching Threshold VAR, to capture the feature
of distinctively diﬀerent transmission mechanisms. One virtue of the TVAR model
is that it allows the regime to be selected endogenously, depending on the other
variables and shocks in the system. It creates both non-linear and conditional dy-
namics in response to structural shocks3. Therefore, the TVAR model is general
enough not only to capture diﬀerent transmission mechanisms conditional on en-
dogenous variables like ﬁnancial market conditions, but also to generate diﬀerent
responses depending on the size and direction of structural shocks.
A prominent application of a univariate type of this model is Potter (1995), who
studies regime dependent shock transmissions to US GNP. Artis et al. (2007) take
the TVAR approach to study non-linear transmission of shocks between countries.
Shen and Chiang (1999) use a TVAR model in the same style as the one employed
here to study non-linear monetary policy shock transmissions depending on the
economy being in a low or a high inﬂation regime. The paper closest to the
one in hand is Balke (2000), where credit conditions determine the regime of
the economy, which is characterized by output, inﬂation, interest rates, and the
threshold variable determining the credit regime.
This paper incorporates proxies for funding liquidity, credit supply conditions,
interest rates, uncertainty, and overall ﬁnancial market conditions in the TVAR,
2Ben Bernanke in his Feb 24th testimony before the Senate Banking Committee used the
term “adverse feedback loop”
3See for example Shen and Chiang (1999) for an application on the Monetary Transmission
Mechanism
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using US data from Q1 1990 to Q1 2009. Overall ﬁnancial market conditions,
approximated by the TED spread, serve as an endogenous threshold and determine
the prevailing regime. I will shed light on the joint empirical dynamics of these
variables in the 2-regime TVAR and illustrate how ﬁnancial market conditions
change the transmission mechanisms in the macroeconomy, which are shown to be
distinctively diﬀerent in the two regimes.
The next section provides an overview over the Econometric Model and explains
and justiﬁes the inclusion of the variables under consideration. Section 3 presents
the results, and section 4 concludes.
3.2 Econometric Model and Endogenous Variables
A simple and versatile method to model the behavior of a set of variables with
two distinctly diﬀerent dynamics, where the regime is determined endogenously,
is a 2 Regime Threshold VAR with an endogenous threshold. The Threshold
VAR is a multivariate generalization of the Self-Exciting Threshold Autoregression
(SETAR) model proposed by Tong (2005), and a simpler version of the Threshold
cointegration VAR introduced by Lo and Zivot (2001). It can be expressed in
reduced form as
Yt = I (qt ≤ γ)
[
A1 (L)Yt + ε
1
t
]
+ I (qt > γ)
[
A2 (L)Yt + ε
2
t
]
(3.1)
where qt is the threshold, which is also an element of the vector of endogenous
variables Yt. Yt is comprised of GDP growth, credit supply, leverage growth, the
change in the Fed Funds rate, the change in the VIX index, and the TED spread.
Yt =
[
gGDP gCredSup glev ΔFFrate ΔV IX TED
]′ (3.2)
The used data is for the US, from Q1 1990 to Q1 2009, in quarterly frequency.
The threshold element in Yt is deﬁned as Y qt = qt, and qt is the TED spread.
I (qt ≤ γ) is the indicator function, which generates the regime shift. It is equal to
I, the identity matrix, if qt ≤ γ (regime 1), or 0 otherwise (regime 2). In the time
periods when qt is above the threshold, the dynamics of Yt are governed by the
autoregressive process A2 (L)Yt+ε2t , and if qt ≤ γ, then Yt = A1 (L)Yt+ε1t . Hence,
if γ is known, the model reduces to an OLS estimation on two distinct samples,
for which the sample split is identiﬁed by whether qt is above or below the thresh-
old γ. In the setup here however, γ is required to be determined endogenously,
and therefore is not known in advance. This makes the model non-diﬀerentiable
with respect to γ. To estimate the jointly optimal parameters, a simple complete
search for γˆ over of all unique elements4 in qt is performed. Given a value for γ,
4The actual grid search is performed only over the 1 − π percent of all unique element, and
the smallest and largest values for qt are not considered as a valid optimal threshold γˆ, since too
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the estimates for the lag polynomials A1 (L)and A2 (L) (which always include a
constant) can be consistently estimated by simple OLS5. The γ candidate which
generates the minimal log determinant of the sum of squared errors
min
γ
log
(∣∣∣∣
(
ε1t
ε2t
)′(
ε1t
ε2t
)∣∣∣∣
)
is then the threshold estimate γˆ. To take account for diﬀerent sizes of shocks in
each regime, the covariance matrix of errors is allowed to diﬀer across regimes:{
E
[
ε1t (ε
1
t )
′]
= Ω1 ∀t : I (qt ≤ γ)
E
[
ε2t (ε
2
t )
′]
= Ω2 ∀t : I (qt > γ)
A test for the existence of a threshold γ is conducted according to Hansen (2002)6.
3.2.1 Endogenous Variables
The Threshold VAR system comprises proxies for economic growth, credit supply
conditions, funding liquidity, changes in volatility, changes in interest rates, and
ﬁnancial market conditions, which serve as the threshold. The aim is to measure
the eﬀects of funding liquidity, ﬁnancial market risk, and credit supply on economic
growth. In addition, I am interested in the mutual eﬀects among the variables
in the system, allowing for diﬀerent transmission mechanisms depending on the
regime of the economy.
Funding liquidity is proxied by commercial bank leverage growth, calculated
from the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds Commercial Bank data as Total As-
sets divided by the diﬀerence of Total Assets and Total Liabilities, from quarterly
seasonally unadjusted data. As has been argued by Adrian and Shin (2010), in-
vestment banks increase their leverage in response to an increase in the value of
their existing asset portfolio, which creates a strong pro-cyclical eﬀect of banks’
demand for assets and hence their supply of funding. The focus in this paper,
few observations would remain to estimate the coeﬃcients A (L) for one of the regimes. In order
to maximize the statistical power, π should be between 5 and 15% (see Tong (2005)). The results
here are checked against sensitivity in π, but any value between 5 and 15% leads to exactly the
same threshold value.
5The same applies for restrictions imposed on the parameter matrices A1 (L)and A2 (L). For
example certain variables can be allowed to enter in regime 2 only, or parameters can be restricted
to be equal in both regimes.
6Hansen (2002) is a multivariate generalization to Hansen (1996). The test here is a special
case of a know cointegration vector, as Yt is assumed to be stationary. Note that the simulated
(by ﬁxed regressor bootstrap) test statistic is based on a heteroskedasticity consistent covariance
estimator. Therefore, the structure proposed here ﬁts entirely into the testing setup; including
possible restrictions on the parameter matrices.
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however, is rather on commercial banks, as they are one of the most important
provider of funds to the real economy. The upper panel of Figure 3.1 shows that
commercial banks target a certain leverage ratio, which is likely to be determined
by the regulatory framework. When the value of commercial banks’ assets in-
crease, this would decrease their leverage ratio, if banks were acting passively. On
the contrary, evidence for active balance sheet management can be observed. To
maintain the target leverage ratio, banks further increase their asset holdings in
response to an increase in the value of assets. Adrian and Shin’s basic argument is
thus also valid for commercial banks. In a prosperous environment, in which the
value of assets increases, banks are trying to expand their asset portfolio. This is
a pertinent point, as it implies that an exogenous increase in asset values spurs
a further increase in demand for assets. To illustrate which types of assets are
aﬀected, the lower panel of ﬁgure 3.1 shows the covariance contribution of secu-
rities, loans, and other assets to the variance of asset growth. In the run-up to
the 2007/2008 crisis, banks were expanding their balance sheets by buying securi-
ties, mostly Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac securitized papers. The contribution of
loans is positive throughout the whole period, which means that increases in the
growth rate of total assets will have a positive eﬀect on the provision of loans. The
pro-cyclical expansion of balance sheets will thus increase the supply of funding,
or the ’funding liquidity’, in the economy. This increase materializes in the form
of funding for securities, traditional bank loans, and other assets. When funding
liquidity is high, banks will also be able to securitize more loans and resell them for
acceptable prices and, as a results, will have spare capacities to provide additional
funding (see Altunbas et al. (2009)).
Funding liquidity of banks, and therefore their leverage growth, is linked to the
degree of uncertainty in ﬁnancial markets, as argued by Adrian and Shin (2010).
When uncertainty rises, the value-at-risk (VaR) increases. The VaR measures the
maximum absolute amount of losses which materialize with a given probability.
At any time, banks want to maintain a suﬃcient amount of equity to be able to
absorb the possible losses without compromising their solvency. A rise in uncer-
tainty, which automatically increases the VaR, consequently would require banks
to hold more equity. As equity is diﬃcult to raise in the short-run, banks reduce
the absolute amount of possible losses instead, by selling risky assets. This puts
downward pressure on asset prices, and in turn, tightens the capital base even fur-
ther, as banks have to incur losses on their existing asset portfolios. In a favorable
scenario, the analog reverse feedback eﬀects are at work.
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Both graphs are based on the data from the Flow of Funds Table 109. The covariance con-
tributions are calculated as follows: Total Assets At consist of Loans, Securities and the
rest of the asset side balance sheet positions. Thus At = SECt + LOANt + RESTt. As
an expression of the growth-rate of A this becomes gAt =
ΔSECt
At−1
+ ΔLOANtAt−1 +
ΔRESTt
At−1
.
The relative variance contribution of each constituent is given by var(gAt )var(gAt ) =
cov(gAt ,gAt )
var(gAt )
=
cov(
ΔSECt
At−1 ,gAt )
var(gAt )
+
cov(
ΔLOANt
At−1 ,gAt )
var(gAt )
+
cov(
ΔRESTt
At−1 ,gAt )
var(gAt )
Figure 3.1: Leverage Growth versus Asset Growth for Commercial Banks & Mar-
gins of Adjustment in Asset Growth
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Changes in uncertainty are approximated by the change in the VIX index7,
obtained from Datastream as daily data. It is then transformed into quarterly
averages to smooth out high frequency spikes. On this basis, the annualized quar-
terly growth rate is calculated. Figure 3.2 shows the graphs for leverage growth
and the VIX index. Even though leverage is likely to be inﬂuenced to a high degree
by the regulatory framework, there is a signiﬁcant negative relationship between
expected volatility and the leverage of commercial banks.
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The upper ﬁgure plots the normalized (zero mean and unit variance) values of the variables over
time. Commercial Banks Leverage is calculated as the aggregate total assets divided over the
aggregate equity from the Flow of Funds data obtained from the Federal Reserve website. The
lower ﬁgure displays the Commercial Banks Leverage versus the VIX index (both normalized)
and the least square errors linear ﬁt.
Figure 3.2: Commercial Bank Leverage and Financial Market Volatility
Moreover, expected uncertainty by itself is a propagator of credit supply and
economic activity. Lower expected volatility implies lower credit risks for banks
7The VIX index captures the implied volatility derived from the prices of the most traded
options. Most speciﬁcally, the VIX is the square-root of the risk neutral expectation of the S&P
500 variance over the next 30 calendar days and is quoted as an annualized standard deviation
in percentage terms. Therefore it is a suitable measure for expected volatility.
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and lower costs of funding for ﬁrms, which will increase the overall credit sup-
ply and demand and lead to additional economic activity. Figure 3.3 displays
the change in seasonally unadjusted delinquency rates on Loans and Leases for
Commercial Banks, obtained from the Federal Reserve, for all types of bank loans,
together with the change in the VIX index. Statistically, expected volatility clearly
contains relevant information about future delinquencies at commercial banks and
hence the risks banks are facing, which, in turn, inﬂuence their credit supply de-
cisions.
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Standardized Diﬀerences denote the quarterly changes of the zero mean and unit variance series of
delinquency rates and the VIX index. Delinquency rates are for Loans and Leases of Commercial
Banks obtained from the Federal Reserve website.
Figure 3.3: Delinquency Rates on Loans and Leases for Commercial Banks and
the VIX Index
To distinguish the fundamentally diﬀerent behavior of “good” and “bad” cycles,
the endogenous threshold should capture ﬁnancial market conditions in general.
The estimation procedure of the TVAR will select the optimal value of the thresh-
old, as described above. One variable that has been used widely as a suitable
indicator of distress in ﬁnancial and credit markets is the TED spread, which is
the diﬀerence between the LIBOR (London Interbank Oﬀered Rate) and the rate
for 3-month US Treasury Bills. It captures the risk premia for obtaining liquidity
in the interbanking market as a markup over T-Bills, which are assumed to carry
a very low risk of default. The T-Bill rates also contain a ’ﬂight-to-quality’ ef-
fect. In rough ﬁnancial conditions, investors tend to shift their portfolios towards
safer assets, in particular the 3-month T-Bill. This technically lowers the yield
on T-Bills and blows up the TED spread. If the TED spread is high, it signals
80
Chapter 3 The Real Eﬀects of Liquidity and Financial Market Conditions
distressed conditions, either because of a fear of default in the interbanking market
or a substantial ﬂight-to-quality. Both scenarios describe situations when ﬁnan-
cial markets are under severe stress. The TED spread can hence be considered
as a reasonable proxy for ﬁnancial market conditions in general. In particular, it
directly signals, whether banks have funding problems, which is crucial for identi-
fying possible liquidity spirals. Another widely proposed measure in this respect
is the LIBOR-OIS spread8, which is the spread between the average London Inter-
bank Oﬀered Rate and the Overnight Interest Swap for a maturity of 3 months.
The OIS is surveyed by Bloomberg, but it is, unfortunately, only available from
the end of 2001. Due to this substantial restriction, I will instead be content with
the Ted spread. Figure 3.4 plots the quarterly average of the TED spread versus
the quarterly average of the LIBOR-OIS spread from Q1 1988 to Q4 2008.
1993 1995 1998 2001 2004 2006
50
100
150
200
B
as
is
 P
oi
nt
s 
p.
a.
Commercial Paper Spread
TED Spread
LIBOR−OIS Spread
The data on commercial paper spreads is a composite series with the average dealer oﬀering
rate for 30 days Commercial Paper for AA rated ﬁrms minus the 3 month T-Bill rate until Q4
1996 and from Q1 1997 until Q1 2009 it is the equivalent rate for ﬁnancial ﬁrms only. The
LIBOR-OIS spread is the spread between the average London Interbank Oﬀered Rate and the
Overnight Interest Swap with a maturity of 3 months from Bloomberg. The data for the other
two series is obtained from the Federal Reserve website.
Figure 3.4: LIBOR-OIS, TED and Commercial Paper Spreads
The LIBOR9 and OIS data is taken from the British Bankers Association web-
site and Bloomberg, whereas the other data is from the Federal Reserve website.
8See for example Thornton (2009)
9The LIBOR data used here is the 3-month rate for credit agreements denominated in US$.
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Qualitatively, the dynamics are quite similar. The TED spread tends to be more
volatile, as expected, but moves together with the LIBOR-OIS spread quite well.
Additionally, the Commercial Paper spread series is shown to be highly correlated
with the TED spread. The Commercial Paper spread is a composite series with
the average dealer oﬀering rate for 30 days Commercial Paper for AA rated ﬁrms
minus the 3 month T-Bill rate until Q4 1996. Thereafter, it is the equivalent rate
for ﬁnancial ﬁrms only10. The Commercial Paper spread measures the premium
which investors demand in order to hold short term debt of highly rated creditors,
with very low default risks. As the risk premium for default risks contained in this
spread is likely to be very low, the Commercial Paper spread arguably reﬂects the
ease at which reﬁnancing through capital markets; in other words the demand for
short-term debt. Its high correlation with the TED spread corroborates the view
that the TED spread is an adequate measure of overall ﬁnancial and credit market
conditions.
Credit supply conditions are approximated following Adrian and Shin (2010):
The survey data from the Chief Loan Oﬃcer is used as an instrument for the
total quarterly growth in non-ﬁnancial debt11 to isolate the part of total credit,
which is correlated with changes in supply conditions. I employ the survey data on
commercial and industrial (C&I) loans as well as C&I real-estate loans12 for both
large/medium and small ﬁrms, and increased spreads of loan rates over banks’ cost
of funds. The estimated values from the ﬁrst stage linear regression constitute the
proxy for credit supply conditions. The calculated proxy is plotted in Figure 3.5.
It displays nicely an increased supply for the run-up towards the recent ﬁnancial
crisis in 2007/2008, followed by a corresponding sharp decline. The decline at the
beginning of the sample can be attributed to the savings and loan crisis.
The interest rate variable in the TVAR is the change in the Fed Funds rate.
Both the change in the Fed Funds rate and the TED spread are measured in basis
points per annum.
Economic growth is captured by the seasonally adjusted GDP growth rate13
from the Flow of Funds data of the Federal Reserve.
10From 1997 the Fed only reports the Commercial Paper rates for ﬁnancials and non-ﬁnancials
separately.
11Flow of Funds Table 2.
12Increased Spreads are not surveyed for C&I real estate loans.
13Throughout the paper, growth rates are expressed as the annualized quarterly rate.
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The original series is the annualized quarterly growth rate of non-ﬁnancial credit from the Flow
of Funds Table 2. The ﬁtted series is the credit supply proxy, which are the ﬁtted values from a
linear regression of the original series on the Chief Loan Oﬃcer survey data on commercial and
industrial loans on both large/medium and small ﬁrms, and increased spreads of loan rates over
banks’ cost of funds and real estate C&I loans.
Figure 3.5: Credit Supply Proxy
3.2.2 Impulse Response Functions
The impact of a shock in period t on the vector of dependent variables Yt+k in this
setup can most easily be deﬁned as14:
IRFt+k|t−1(vt) = E [Yt+k |Yt−1, vt ]− E [Yt+k |Yt−1 ] (3.3)
As the regime is allowed to switch endogenously, shocks will generate diﬀerent
impulse responses depending on whether a regime shift occurs. If the economy is
in a “good” credit regime, a relatively large positive shock of type j, denoted as
vj,t+1, might cause an initial regime-switch to the bad regime, given the threshold
variable qt, in response to the shock, exceeds the threshold value γ. A negative
shock, on the contrary, would not have had this kind of initial eﬀect. As the
dynamics in the “good” and in the “bad” regime are diﬀerent, the response to a
14Note that this formulation is not identical to Koop et al.’s (1996) formulation of non-
linear Impulse Response Functions, which is common in this type of literature. The “Gen-
eralized” Impulse Response Function is IRFt+k|t−1(vt) = E [Yt+k |Yt−1, vt, ut+1, ..., ut+k ] −
E [Yt+k |Yt−1, ut+1, ..., ut+k ], where the u′ts are a series of shocks which hit both expectation
terms. Firstly, this simulation exercise consumes a lot of computing time while it changes the
results only in a few cases, and if, only to a negligible extent. Secondly, the interpretation of
the Impulse Responses proposed here is more straight-forward in the additive non-linear TVAR
framework under consideration.
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shock v depends on its magnitude and direction. Further, the distance to threshold
‖qt − γ‖, which indicates how large a positive or negative shock on qt causes a
regime switch, is time-varying. Therefore, depending on the conditioning period
t, a shock in t+ 1 of the same size can either cause a regime switch or not, as the
distance to threshold in period t can be smaller or greater.
Therefore, the IRFs are, as a result of the regime-switching nature of the model,
non-linear functions of both the size of the shock and the conditioning period t;
as opposed to a linear VAR system, where the IRFs are homogeneous functions of
degree 1 of the size of v and homogeneous functions of degree 0 of the conditioning
period t. Naturally, this makes calculating the IRFs relatively more complex.15
The additional complexity allows, however, to generate completely diﬀerent dy-
namics, given the state of the economy and the severity of a shock. The model, for
example, would be able to generate dynamics such that an adverse shock on credit
market conditions aﬀects economic growth much more persistently, if the shock
occurs at a time when the economy is already in a “bad” regime. Or, interest rate
shocks could have a much lower initial eﬀect on credit demand in a “bad” regime
than in a “good” regime.
While a linear model does not have this kind of desirable features, the TVAR
with an endogenous threshold variable does allow for conditional dynamics, whilst
being estimable with a simple combination of grid-search and OLS methods.
For illustrative purposes, I will also refer to the linear Impulse Response Func-
tion. The linear Impulse Response Function in this setup simply takes the two
regimes separately and therefore does not allow for a regime-shift. It is calcu-
lated through the normal recursion in exactly the same way as for a linear VAR,
using the coeﬃcient estimates and covariance matrix of shocks for the respective
regimes. Hence, the linear Impulse Response Functions provide the impacts of a
shock, assuming that the economy is permanently in a given regime.
3.2.3 Identiﬁcation of Structural Shocks
The analysis here focuses on a simple contemporaneous identiﬁcation scheme. As
there is no deﬁnite theoretical justiﬁcation for a restriction on the transmission
mechanism or on long term mutual eﬀects, imposing identifying restrictions of any
kind would seem overly restrictive in this context. In turn, the issue of interest is,
whether the data will let the econometric model indeed detect diﬀerent regimes
and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent transmission mechanisms.
As the results are not supposed to be aﬀected a priori by a diﬀerent identi-
ﬁcation across regimes, it is natural to apply the same identiﬁcation scheme for
regimes 1 and 2. Note that the transmission mechanism of shocks will neverthe-
15A detailed description of how the IRFs are calculated is provided in the Appendix.
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less diﬀer across regimes (see the Appendix for details). Also, by assumption, the
structural shocks in regime 1 and 2 are uncorrelated.
Given the nature of the variables under consideration, there is, to a certain ex-
tent, a natural ordering according to the timing of adjustment. A shock to growth
will certainly have a contemporaneous eﬀect on all the other variables, whereas a
shock to credit supply conditions will have a contemporaneous eﬀect on the ﬁnan-
cial market variables, but only a subsequent eﬀect on growth. I further argue, that
the bank’s balance sheets adjust faster than credit supply conditions, but slower
than the remaining ﬁnancial market variables. As banks balance sheets are com-
prised of both longer-term (such as private and industrial loans) and shorter-term
(traded ﬁnancial assets and liabilities) items, a shock to leverage growth would
aﬀect the ﬁnancial markets immediately, however would probably take some time
to spill into credit supply conditions and GDP growth. As for the group of ﬁnan-
cial market variables, the ordering is a priori ﬂexible. The ordering underlying the
results in the next section is the change in the Fed Funds rate, the change in the
VIX index and the TED spread.
The results for other meaningful identiﬁcation schemes are presented in section
3.3.1.
3.3 Results
Figure 3.6 displays the TED spread and the threshold estimate selected by the
model.
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Figure 3.6: The TED Spread and the Threshold Estimate
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The division between the “good” regime, which is below and on the threshold,
and the “bad” regime is clear-cut and the threshold estimate is at a TED spread
of around 50 basis points. The extreme values of the ﬁnancial crisis fall into the
“bad” regime (Q3 2007 until Q1 2009) as well as some periods in the middle of the
sample, which include the inﬂation and the burst of the ’tech-bubble’ in Q3 1999/
Q1 2000. Table 3.1 displays the descriptive statistics of the variables in each of
the regimes.
GDP Credit Supply Leverage Change Change TED
Growth Growth Growth FF Rate VIX Spread
Regime 1
mean 5.11 6.51 0.19 -0.19 -4.97 31.389
std 1.67 1.06 49.4 14.96 56.68 10.19
sum 275.8 351.4 10.5 -10 -268.4
Regime 2
mean 3.91 6.33 -12.09 -7.1 54.2 90.9
std 3.62 1.28 58.78 17.8 151.2 46.57
sum 82.0 132.9 -253.9 -149 1138.1
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics for each Regime
Clearly, the variances are higher in the second regime, as well as the mean
values of the change in the VIX index and the TED spread, which both signal
distress in ﬁnancial markets. The parameter estimates of the model are presented
in Table 3.2, together with the asymptotic t-stats and the p-value of the Hansen
(2002) test for existence of a threshold in this class of models. A p-value of around
4 % is a clear rejection of the no-threshold hypothesis, given the dimensionality
of the model. Particularly, as the threshold is a variable of very low persistence,
which allows to identify the regimes more precisely, the joint dynamics of the more
slowly moving variables in the system may not diﬀer too much across regimes,
even though the model detects a sharp regime shift. The Hansen-test, however,
strongly supports the view of the two detected regimes exhibiting very diﬀerent
joint dynamics. The optimal lag-length according to the AIC and BIC information
criteria are a 1-quarter and 2-quarter lag for the normal regime and a 1-quarter lag
for the “bad” regime16. The inclusion of only a 1-quarter lag for the “bad” regime
is due to the fact that in the “bad” regime, the endogenous variables behave much
16The inclusion of higher-order lags up to 4 quarters for regime 1 does not qualitatively change
the Impulse Response Functions and results in only marginally diﬀerent threshold estimates.
The only noticeable diﬀerence is the impact of a GDP growth shock on GDP itself in regime 1,
which is more persistent. In general, the estimates are much less precise such that the results
are statistically not diﬀerent from the more parsimonious setup with 2 lags.
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more radically and their joint relationships are obviously not as stable as in the
tranquil regime.
Const GDP Credit Supply Leverage Change Change TED
Growth Growth Growth FF Rate VIX Spread
Regime 1
GDP 2.31 0.30 0.34 -0.008 -0.002 -0.005 -0.03
Growth (1.00) (1.53) (1.03) (-0.96) (-0.12) (-0.72) (-1.64)
Credit Supply 1.10 0.05 0.82 0.0018 0.0045 0.001 -0.0046
Growth (1.10) (0.58) (5.80) (0.51) (0.55) (0.34) (-0.65)
Leverage -77.55 1.15 13.58 -0.35 -0.15 0.065 -0.46
Growth (-1.44) (0.25) (1.78) (-1.81) (-0.34) (0.42) (-1.20)
Change -35.36 2.56 3.6441 0.06 0.29 0.00064 -0.037
FF Rate (-1.13) (0.95) (0.82) (0.49) (1.14) (0.0067) (-0.17)
Change -13.88 2.56 0.13 -0.35 0.19 -0.13 -0.25
VIX (-0.12) (0.26) (0.0083) (-0.87) (0.20) (-0.40) (-0.31)
TED 3.45 1.24 1.45 -0.040 0.12 0.059 0.36
Spread (0.18) (0.74) (0.52) (-0.56) (0.75) (1.02) (2.59)
Regime 2
GDP 8.44 0.23 -0.21 0.0074 -0.008 0.0002 -0.046
Growth (3.05) (0.70) (-0.49) (0.67) (-0.25) (0.03) (-2.81)
Credit Supply 4.44 0.16 0.36 0.0083 -0.029 -0.005 -0.014
Growth (3.70) (1.12) (1.92) (1.73) (-2.10) (-1.79) (-1.92)
Leverage 21.81 -9.62 16.32 -0.14 -0.086 0.069 -1.31
Growth (0.34) (-1.26) (1.63) (-0.55) (5) (0.46) (-3.41)
Change 54.41 1.10 -0.0047 0.28 -0.99 -0.11 -1.10
FF Rate (1.46) (0.25) (-0.0008) (1.84) (-2.31) (-1.30) (-4.78)
Change -34.35 1.76 -1.15 -0.10 1.62 -0.057 1.54
VIX (-0.25) (0.11) (-0.055) (-0.18) (1.05) (-0.18) (1.91)
TED -62.04 1.71 8.65 -0.25 1.05 0.11 1.23
Spread (-2.64) (0.61) (2.37) (-2.62) (3.89) (2.02) (8.80)
Threshold Estimate (TED Spread): 49.9 basis points
P-Value of Hansen Test Against Alternative of No Threshold: 0.0420
Asymptotic t-statistic are given in brackets. Reported estimates are for a model with 2 lags
for Regime 1 and 1 lag for Regime 2. For regime 1, the coeﬃcient estimates and t-stats
denote the sum of the respective coeﬃcients and joint t-stats over all lags. The p-value of the
Hansen (2002) test is calculated with 1000 bootstrap replications. The trimming factor is set to
10% (5% on both ends). Signiﬁcance at a 1% level is indicated by ***, at 5% by ** and 10% by *.
Table 3.2: Parameter Estimates and Asymptotic Signiﬁcance
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Especially in the ﬁnancial crisis at the end of the sample, reactions of GDP
growth, the TED spread, and leverage growth have barely any relation to their
joint levels 6 months ago. Within the “bad” regime it therefore seems natural that
only information of the very recent past can have an inﬂuence on the current state
of the economy.
Generally, the relationships between the endogenous variables are more pro-
nounced and also more likely to be statistically signiﬁcant in regime 2. In partic-
ular, overall ﬁnancial market conditions, proxied by the TED spread, show a dis-
tinctively diﬀerent impact, depending on the prevailing regime. The linear Impulse
Responses17 of the diﬀerent variables as a response to a one standard-deviation
(1-std) shock in the TED spread are plotted in Figure 3.7. Firstly, ﬁnancial market
conditions exhibit a sizable direct impact on GDP growth. A positive 1-std TED
shock, which signals a deterioration in ﬁnancial market conditions, has a cumula-
tive long-run eﬀect of -1.5 percentage points on GDP growth. Further, the TED
shock strongly impacts credit supply growth as well as leverage growth, which is
the proxy for liquidity. The cumulative eﬀect on leverage growth is around -20% in
the long run. For the 2007-2009 crisis, where extreme quarter-to-quarter changes
in the TED spread are observable, this implies a huge pressure for de-leveraging.
In the short run, a positive 1-std TED shock has a strong initial impact of +20%
on volatility growth as well.
This constitutes ﬁrst evidence for an adverse feedback loop between liquidity
and ﬁnancial market conditions during times of ﬁnancial market instability, which
is corroborated by the negative and signiﬁcant estimates of the second regime
parameters of the TED spread in the equation for leverage growth, and vice versa.
The absence of this self-enforcing eﬀect in the ’good’ regime is an indication for
the altering transmission mechanism of liquidity and ﬁnancial market conditions
during ﬁnancial crisis, as suggested by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) and
Frank et al. (2008). However, the real eﬀect of a leverage shock is fairly small.
Figure 3.8 depicts the real eﬀects of all the 6 diﬀerent shocks for each regime
separately. The eﬀect of ﬁnancial market conditions seems to dominate the other
eﬀects in regime 2. Note that, given the generally higher standard errors in regime
2, the absolute initial impacts of all shocks are considerably stronger in the ’bad’
regime. Even though the initial impacts of credit-supply and liquidity shocks are
fairly large, they are short-lived.
17As explained in section 3.2.2, the linear impulse responses are calculated on the basis of the
parameter estimates for each regime separately. A regime shift is not allowed, and hence they can
be calculated in exactly the same way as in a linear VAR. The asymptotic conﬁdence intervals
are derived analogously.
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The plots depict the linear cumulative Impulse Response Functions for each regime for a 1-std
TED shock. The dashed lines denote the corresponding 90% asymptotic conﬁdence intervals.
gGDP , gCredSup and glev are quarterly growth rates measured in % p.a.. The change in the
Fed Funds rate ΔFFrate and the TED spread TED are measured in basis points p.a.. ΔV IX
denotes the change in the VIX index.
Figure 3.7: Linear Cumulative Impulse Response Functions for a 1-Std TED Shock
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The plots depict the linear cumulative Impulse Response Functions of GDP growth for all types
of shocks within the given regime. Each shock is of a 1-std size for the respective variable and
regime. A 1-std shock in regime 2 is larger than a 1-std shock in regime 1, and consequently
the observed initial absolute impacts are higher. The dashed lines denote the corresponding 90%
asymptotic conﬁdence intervals.
Figure 3.8: Linear Cumulative Impulse Response Functions for all Types of Shocks
on GDP Growth
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To illustrate the short and long-run impacts over time, Figure 3.9 contains
the non-linear Impulse Response Functions, which allow for regime switches, as
described in section 3.2.2.
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The surface plots show the non-linear Impulse Response Functions as described in section 3.2.2
for the respective shocks to GDP growth conditional on the time when the shocks hit.
Figure 3.9: Non-Linear Impulse Response Functions for Diﬀerent Shocks on Out-
put Growth
The graphs represent the cumulative impact of a 1-std deviation shock condi-
tional on the time when the shock hits. Given the prevailing regime at this date,
the 1-std shock can again have two diﬀerent absolute values. The diﬀerent impacts
and responses over time and across regimes are very pronounced. In particular, it
strengthens the evidence of a real eﬀect of liquidity and ﬁnancial market conditions
in times of ﬁnancial distress. The extreme negative long-run impacts of the gV IX
and TED shocks occur at the burst of the tech-bubble. Nonetheless, in the recent
crisis at the end of the sample, the negative eﬀects are also relatively strong. In
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distressed ﬁnancial conditions, also the liquidity shocks have a stronger, though
still small, impact on GDP growth.
To further investigate, which shocks are driving GDP growth, I conduct both a
linear and a non-linear Variance Decomposition of GDP growth, which is explained
in detail in the Appendix. Figure 3.10 provides the linear Variance Decomposition,
taking the two regimes separately.
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The two graphs show the linear variance decompositions for GDP growth for the respective
regimes. The series plot the contribution of the respective shocks to the mean squared forecast
error of GDP growth, with the forecast-horizon on the horizontal axis.
Figure 3.10: Contributions to Mean Squared Forecast Error of the Diﬀerent Types
of Shocks to Output
The forecast error of GDP growth in the ﬁrst regime is, more or less, completely
determined by its own shocks. In the “bad” regime, however, shocks to overall
ﬁnancial market conditions contribute noticeably to long run variance of GDP
growth.
Figure 3.11 shows the non-linear variance decomposition for the period Q1 1999
until Q4 2000, which covers the tumultuous period of the ’dot-com bubble’, and
the analogous graphs for Q1 2007 until Q1 2009, in order to capture the recent
ﬁnancial crisis. The former period is very illustrative, as it exhibits several regime
switches (see Figure 3.6). At each point in time, the contribution to the long-
run variance of GDP growth is plotted for every shock. Regime switches can be
easily identiﬁed as the periods where the variances, and therefore the variance
contributions, are distinctively higher. Note that the variance contributions of the
shocks are diﬀerent depending on the size and direction of the shock. A negative
shock is supposed to resemble the typical after-crisis situation.
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The graphs depict the long-run variance contributions to GDP growth of the respective shocks
for the ’dot-com bubble’ and the 2007-2009 ﬁnancial crisis for diﬀerent sizes of initial shocks.
The series are based on the non-linear variance decomposition as described in the Appendix.
Figure 3.11: Non-Linear Variance Decompositions for Output Growth
It implies not only a negative shock on output, credit supply and leverage, but
also a negative shock to the TED spread, changes in the Fed Funds Rate and change
in the VIX index. This is a situation, where ﬁnancial markets are recovering,
accompanied by expansionary monetary policy. In the ’dot-com bubble’ period,
the long-run variance of GDP growth in the recovery scenario is mainly driven by
interest rate shocks and shocks to GDP growth itself. Credit Supply also seems to
play a role, depending on the size of the negative shock. The situation for the end
93
Chapter 3 The Real Eﬀects of Liquidity and Financial Market Conditions
of the sample, however, is slightly diﬀerent. The reason is that the TED spread
is so high, that no real recovery scenario exists. A switch back to the favorable
regime could only be achieved by a much larger negative shock. In this sense, the
scenario with a negative shock is not fundamentally diﬀerent from the scenario
with the positive shock in the last 2 years of the sample, and consequently, the
graphs look very much alike.
The scenario with positive shocks resembles a typical situation at the outbreak
of a crisis, when economic growth is still solid, but ﬁnancial market conditions
are suddenly reversing. Banks, however, are still expanding their balance sheets
and relaxing credit supply conditions. This is a scenario quite similar to the
actual situation at the beginning of the recent ﬁnancial crisis. The real eﬀects of
ﬁnancial market conditions are again clearly visible. Besides output growth itself,
the shocks to the TED spread, as well as the VIX index in the earlier period, are
the main contributors to the variation in GDP growth; at the end of the sample
period. This constitutes further evidence for the strong transmission mechanism of
ﬁnancial market conditions to the real economy in times of ﬁnancial distress, which
is absent in the ’normal’ regime. Nevertheless, the shocks from the ﬁnancial side
can only explain around one-third of the long-run variance of GDP growth. At the
end, more fundamental sources seem to drive economic growth, which may have
to do with economic sentiment and expectations about future economic growth,
reﬂected by the strong impact of the growth shocks themselves.
3.3.1 Robustness Issues
The Hansen (2002) test for the existence of a threshold clearly rejects the null-
hypothesis of no threshold in the given speciﬁcation, as reported in Table 3.2.
Given the existence of a threshold, I perform an informal test18 for the value of the
threshold through a Monte-Carlo simulation. The simulation is done recursively,
starting with the value of Yt at t = 1 and then iterating forward using the Monte
Carlo draws for the errors based on a Normal limiting distribution, with the vari-
ance equal to the variance of all estimated shocks, regardless of the regime. Note
that the recursion is non-linear, since the appropriate parameters for the recursion
depend on whether the TED spread is above the threshold, or not. The corre-
sponding threshold is the original estimate of 49.9 basis points. Figure 3.12 shows
the distribution of the threshold estimate, which exhibits a clear concentration
around 50 basis points.
18A formal test for the value of the threshold, so far, is not available. This is due to the
complexity of deriving a limiting distribution, since the distribution of the errors change with
the threshold value. This is notwithstanding the problem of whether a threshold actually ex-
ists. Therefore, an informal test based on a Monte Carlo simulation seems a commensurate
approximation to the testing problem.
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The plotted distribution presents the outcome of 5000 Monte-Carlo simulations of equation (3.1).
The simulations are based on the recursively generated values for the endogenous variables based
on a Normal limiting distribution.
Figure 3.12: Distribution of the Threshold Estimate - Monte Carlo Simulation
Since the recursion generates regime-shifts in periods where no regime-shifts
are observable in the original sample, the Monte-Carlo simulation is very likely to
produce extreme deviations from the underlying data and therefore of the resulting
estimates. Such a clear concentration of the simulated distribution around the
actual estimate is arguably an indication of an exiguous variance of the threshold
estimate.
Given the relatively precise threshold estimate, the results still depend on the
proposed ad-hoc identiﬁcation of the shocks, since a rotation of variables implies
a diﬀerent matrix of structural shocks P1 (details are given in the Appendix). All
possible orderings within the group of ﬁnancial variables (glev,ΔFFrate, ΔV IX,
TED) are tested and the results are robust to the rotations. If ΔV IX is moved
further backwards in the ordering such that its shocks have no contemporaneous
eﬀects on the other variables, its long term impact on GDP growth and the TED
spread diminishes. All other Impulse Responses, however, remain almost identical.
Hence, the real eﬀects of changes in volatility are possibly even smaller than in
the baseline identiﬁcation scheme. If a TED spread-shock is allowed to have a
contemporaneous eﬀect on glev, ΔV IX and ΔFFrate, its real eﬀects and variance
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contributions to GDP growth are even more pronounced. More realistic, however,
seems an ordering where interest rate shocks have an immediate eﬀect on expected
volatility and ﬁnancial market conditions and the Fed reacts to changes in ﬁnancial
markets in the following period.
Another meaningful, and more substantial, change in the identiﬁcation scheme
concerns credit supply conditions (gCredSup). Arguably, credit supply growth could
also be immediately aﬀected by shocks on ﬁnancial markets. As a robustness check,
I choose gCredSup to be the last variable in the system. The corresponding cumula-
tive Impulse Response Functions are plotted in Figures 3.13 and 3.14. For all the
other variables, the responses are hardly diﬀerent from the baseline model. The
credit supply shock now has a slightly negative, albeit still small, impact on GDP
growth. Accordingly, the linear variance decompositions exhibit no visible alter-
ation and hence they are not shown. Also, the non-linear time-dependent variance
decomposition for GDP growth, presented in Figure 3.15, is almost identical to
the baseline ordering.
The two central results therefore seem to be independent of the orderings dis-
cussed above: (i) the transmission mechanism of ﬁnancial market conditions to
the real economy is stronger in situations of ﬁnancial distress, whereas in normal
times this eﬀect is absent; and (ii) the real eﬀects of ﬁnancial market conditions
are still not the dominant drivers of the real economy, which remain the output
shocks themselves.
3.4 Conclusions
To capture non-linear and regime dependent feedback eﬀects of liquidity and ﬁnan-
cial market conditions, this paper employs a Threshold VAR with the TED spread
being the endogenous threshold variable, which was put forward as a measure for
ﬁnancial market conditions in general.
The model detected two regimes, which exhibit distinctively diﬀerent trans-
mission mechanisms in a system of GDP growth, proxied credit supply growth,
leverage growth of commercial banks as a measure of funding liquidity, the Fed
Funds Rate, the change in the VIX index as a proxy for expected volatility, and
the TED spread. Regime 2, is identiﬁed by a TED spread above the estimated
threshold of around 50 basis points and is supposed to indicate ’bad’ or distressed
ﬁnancial conditions, whereas regime 1 reﬂects a ’normal’ ﬁnancial market environ-
ment.
Two main results can be carved out. Firstly, the transmission mechanism of
ﬁnancial market conditions to the real economy is much stronger in situations of
ﬁnancial distress, whereas in ’normal’ times this eﬀect is absent. Secondly, even
though the real eﬀects of ﬁnancial market conditions are signiﬁcant, they are not
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accountable for more than one third of the variation in GDP growth. Despite
some evidence for a mutual feedback eﬀect between ﬁnancial market conditions
and liquidity in regime 2, as suggested by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), the
feedback from liquidity shocks to ﬁnancial market conditions and the real eﬀects of
liquidity shocks are small and short-lived. A non-linear Variance Decomposition
of GDP growth suggests that during the dot-com bubble in 1999/2000 and the
recent ﬁnancial crisis 2007-2009 innovations in the TED spread are responsible for
a signiﬁcant part of the variation, given a shock which resembles an outbreak of
a crisis scenario. In a recovery scenario, however, which in the underlying sample
cannot be replicated for the recent ﬁnancial crisis, interest rate shocks as well as
credit supply shocks contribute strongly to the variation in output growth. This
adds further evidence to the increasingly tighter links between ﬁnancial market
conditions and the real economy in times of ﬁnancial crisis.
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This Figure presents the analog to Figure 3.7 for the alternative identiﬁcation scheme put forward
in section 3.3.1. Plotted are the linear cumulative Impulse Response Functions for each regime
for a 1-std TED shock. The dashed lines denote the corresponding 90% asymptotic conﬁdence
intervals. gGDP , gCredSup and glev are quarterly growth rates measured in % p.a.. The change
in the Fed Funds rate, ΔFFrate, and the TED spread, TED, are measured in basis points p.a..
ΔV IX denotes the change in the VIX index.
Figure 3.13: Linear Cumulative Impulse Response Functions for a 1-Std TED
Shock - Alternative Identiﬁcation Scheme
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This Figure presents the analog to Figure 3.8 for the alternative identiﬁcation scheme put forward
in section 3.3.1. Plotted are the linear cumulative Impulse Response Functions of GDP growth
for all types of shocks within the given regime. Each shock is of a 1-std size for the respective
variable and regime. A 1-std shock in regime 2 is larger than a 1-std shock in regime 1, and
consequently the observed initial absolute impacts are higher. The dashed lines denote the
corresponding 90% asymptotic conﬁdence intervals.
Figure 3.14: Linear Cumulative Impulse Response Functions for all Types of
Shocks on GDP Growth - Alternative Identiﬁcation Scheme
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This Figure presents the analog to Figure 3.11 for the alternative identiﬁcation scheme put
forward in section 3.3.1. The graphs depict the long-run variance contributions to GDP growth
of the respective shocks for the ’dot-com bubble’ and the 2007-2009 ﬁnancial crisis for diﬀerent
sizes of initial shocks. The series are based on the non-linear variance decomposition as described
in the Appendix.
Figure 3.15: Non-Linear Variance Decompositions for Output Growth - Alternative
Identiﬁcation Scheme
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Appendix
Non-Linear Impulse Response Functions
The non-linear Impulse Response functions are deﬁned as
IRFt+k|t(vt) = E [Yt+k |Yt−1, vt ]− E [Yt+k |Yt−1 ]
At time t, the economy can either be in the “good” regime or in the “bad” regime.
In the dual regime setup given by equation (3.1), a “typical” one standard-deviation
shock diﬀers in magnitude between regimes. A 1-std deviation shock in the ’good’
regime is typically smaller in absolute size than a 1 standard-deviation shock in the
’bad’ regime across all types of shocks within the sample under consideration. For
both regimes, the same contemporaneous identiﬁcation scheme is applied. As both
Ω1and Ω2 are symmetric positive deﬁnite matrices, the lower triangular Choleski
decomposition of the regime-dependent covariance matrices is given by
Ω1 = R1D1R
′
1 = R1 (D1)
1
2 (D1)
1
2 R′1 = P1P
′
1
Ω2 = R2D2R
′
2 = R2 (D2)
1
2 (D2)
1
2 R′2 = P2P
′
2
where D1 and D2 are matrices with only positive entries on the diagonal and 0
otherwise. The structural shocks are identiﬁed as{
u1t ≡ (R1)−1 ε1t ∀t : I (qt ≤ γ)
u2t ≡ (R2)−1 ε2t ∀t : I (qt > γ)
The diﬀerent Rs reﬂect the diﬀerent transmission of shocks in each regime. By
assumption
E
[
u1t
(
u1t
)′]
= E
[
u2t
(
u2t
)′]
= I
and
E
[
u1t
(
u2t
)′]
= 0
The non-linear Impulse Response Functions can be calculated as follows:
Let the j−th column of P1 be Pj,1 and the j−th column of P2 be Pj,2. Furthermore,
we have
IRt+k|t = E [Yt+k |Yt−1, vt ]
and
IRt+k|t−1 = E [Yt+k |Yt−1 ]
The threshold element q in IR is denoted as IRq. Then, do a recursion of the
following type:
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1. Choose the type j and size of the shock s in units of standard deviations
plus the time period t in which the system is hit with the shock
2. Calculate IRt|t (j, s) = I (qt−1 ≤ γˆ)
[
Aˆ1Yt−1 + sPj,1
]
+I (qt−1 > γˆ)
[
Aˆ2Yt−1 + sPj,2
]
and IRt|t−1 = I (qt−1 ≤ γˆ)
[
Aˆ1Yt−1
]
+ I (qt > γˆ)
[
Aˆ2Yt−1
]
3. Do a recursion for k = 1, 2, ..., N with IRt+k|t (j, s) = I
(
IRqt+k−1|t ≤ γˆ
) [
A1IRt+k−1|t
]
+
I
(
IRqt+k−1|t > γˆ
) [
A2IRt+k−1|t
]
and the analogous for IRt+k|t−1
4. ˆIRF t+k|t (j, s) = IRt+k|t (j, s) − IRt+k|t−1 which is the j − th column of
ˆIRF t+k|t (s)
At any k, IRt+k|t (j, s) and IRt+k|t−1 can be in diﬀerent regimes. This creates the
non-linear behavior of the IRFs.
Non-Linear Variance Decompositions
The Mean Squared Error (MSE) of a k-period ahead forecast is
MSEt+k|t = Et
[
(Yt+k − Et [Yt+k]) (Yt+k − Et [Yt+k])′
]
=
∑
k
CkΩkC
′
k
∑
k
CkΩkC
′
k =
∑
k
CkPkP
′
kC
′
k =
∑
j
[∑
k
CkPj,kP
′
j,kC
′
k
]
where Ck is the eﬀect in period t+ k of a one standard-deviation (1-std) shock in
period t divided by the corresponding standard deviation19. Ck can potentially be
a product of both A1 and A2 elements. Each element of
∑
j represents the variance
contribution to the total variance of a shock of type j. The covariance matrix Ωk is
either equal to Ω1 if Et [qt+k] ≤ γ or Ω2 if Et [qt+k] > γ. The estimated MSE for a
1-std shock can in principal be expressed as a linear combination of the 1 standard-
deviation estimated IRF. If, at some time t + k, the regime switches, a diﬀerent
covariance matrix must be employed. However, the non-linear IRFs include the
covariance matrix at period t− 1 and not t + k. If I (qt−1 ≤ γˆ) =I
(
IRqt+k|t ≤ γˆ
)
for any k, then it is necessary to switch the estimated covariance matrix at least
once. This can be done simply by a switching factor S.
19Note that this is not equivalent to the eﬀect of a shock of absolute size 1, due to the non-
linearities in the IRFs. Shocks of diﬀerent sizes will create diﬀerent contributions of each shock
to the overall MSE.
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The 1 standard deviation non-linear IRF is equivalent to
IRFt+k|t(1− std) = CkPt
where Pt is either equal to P1 if qt ≤ γ or equal to P2 otherwise. Given the Choleski
factorization of Ω1 and Ω2,
Pk = PtSrt→rt+k
where ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
Srt→rt+k = P
−1
1 P2 if I (qt−1 ≤ γ) = I ∧ Et [qt+k] > γ
Srt→rt+k = I if I (qt−1 ≤ γ) = I ∧ Et [qt+k] ≤ γ
Srt→rt+k = I if I (qt−1 > γ) = I ∧ Et [qt+k] > γ
Srt→rt+k = P
−1
2 P1 if I (qt−1 > γ) = I ∧ Et [qt+k] ≤ γ
The switching factor can be expressed as
S2→1 = P1 (P2)
−1
S1→2 = P2 (P1)
−1
The estimated MSE can now be eﬃciently calculated from the estimated 1-std
non-linear IRFs. For each horizon k = 0, 1, ..., K
ˆMSEt+k|t =
∑
k
ˆIRF t+k|t (1− std) Sˆrt→rt+k Sˆ ′rt→rt+k ˆIRF t+k|t (1− std)′
=
∑
j
[∑
k
ˆIRF j,t+k|t (1− std) Sˆj,rt→rt+k Sˆ ′j,rt→rt+k ˆIRF j,t+k|t (1− std)′
]
The estimated MSEs for shocks of other sizes can be obtained analogously by
scaling P1 and P2 accordingly and by substituting the non-linear Impulse Response
Functions IRFt+k|t with the corresponding values for the desired initial shock size.
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